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I. INTRODUCTION
As direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic tests become more available and
affordable for the general public, a woman orders a DTC genetic test
that gives her results indicating she may be at risk for ovarian cancer.1
Shocked by the possibility of getting cancer, she makes an appointment
to see a doctor. Based on the test results, she persuades her doctor to
order a procedure to remove her ovaries—just to be safe.2 What she did
not understand is that the test results indicate a mere possibility—not
certainty—that she would ever get cancer. It sounds like a nightmare.
There was just one problem: it may not be true. The story appeared,
without much verifying detail, in a Washington Post article that came
out just days before a congressional hearing took place on July 22, 2010,

1. Rob Stein, Genetic Test Mix-Up Reignites Regulation Debate: ‘Wild West’ of
Commercial Interests Weighed Against the Risk of Stifling Innovation, WASH. POST, July
17, 2010, at A1, available at 2010 WLNR 26703791.
2. Id.
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to evaluate the practices of the DTC genetic testing industry.3
Nevertheless, the truth or falsity of this story may not ultimately be the
most poignant part. The story sheds light on the great deal of interest
and major concern surrounding this exciting, but fledgling, industry. The
conflict cuts deep and wide.4 Unsubstantiated accounts like the one above
have been called “fear-mongering” by those reluctant to see the industry
stifled by overregulation or a takeover by the medical profession.5
Perhaps fear does play some part in this saga because genetic issues have
always engendered Orwellian visions of a parade of horribles just over
the horizon.6 Others foresee in such accounts a serious problem in the
3. See Daniel MacArthur, Did Washington Post’s Rob Stein Exaggerate Negative
Stories About Personal Genomics?, WIRED (July 21, 2010), http://www.wired.com/
wiredscience/2010/07/did-washington-posts-rob-stein-exaggerate-negative-stories-aboutpersonal-genomics/. MacArthur expressed skepticism about Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) employee Alberto Gutierrez’s account, noting it was mere hearsay that failed to
describe, in any particularity, under what circumstances the story was true. Id. MacArthur
also noted that the same employee had been quoted before by the same Washington Post
reporter as saying that the FDA regarded the DTC tests “illegal.” Id.
4. Sivan Tamir, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: Ethical-Legal Perspectives
and Practical Considerations, 18 MED. L. REV. 213, 214 (2010) (“[Direct-to-consumer]
testing is subject to frequent and fierce criticism on several issues, including reduced
safety and accuracy due to inadequate scientific evidence to support it, use of unaccredited
laboratories, lack of quality assurance and regulation, insufficient clinical and analytical
validity, and the potential to mislead consumers.” (footnote omitted)). See generally
Marcy Darnovsky, “Moral Questions of an Altogether Different Kind:” Progressive
Politics in the Biotech Age, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 99 (2010) (discussing liberal and
conservative political divides regarding the morality of emerging technologies).
5. See MacArthur, supra note 3.
6. See, e.g., Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-233, § 2(2), 122 Stat. 881, 882 (describing the historical fear of sterilization spurred
by the developing genetics field in the early twentieth century in its legislative findings
prefacing Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) legislation); Dov Fox,
Silver Spoons and Golden Genes: Genetic Engineering and the Egalitarian Ethos, 33
AM. J.L. & MED. 567, 567–70 (2007) (discussing the emerging trend of designer babies
and describing it as “new eugenics”); Maxwell J. Mehlman, Will Directed Evolution
Destroy Humanity, and if So, What Can We Do About It?, 3 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 93 (2009) (discussing potential perils of genetic engineering). During the early
twentieth century, when growing tissue culture was still a new technology, French
surgeon Alexis Carrel claimed to have grown an immortal chicken heart from cultured
cells—which was untrue of course—and said in exaggeration that the cells “would reach
a volume greater than that of the solar system.” REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE
OF HENRIETTA LACKS 61 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The mood of the
country went wild. Id.
The Literary Digest reported that the cells could have already “covered the
earth,” and a British tabloid said they could “form a rooster . . . big enough
today to cross the Atlantic in a single stride, [a bird] so monstrous that when
perched on this mundane sphere, the world, it would look like a weathercock.”
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legal gaping chasm the industry operates within, and they call for clear
guidelines to prevent fraud and misrepresentation.7
Direct-to-consumer genetic testing has been conceptualized in a variety
of ways. Some call it “recreational genomics.”8 Some suggest that these
DTC companies engage in the “practice of medicine.”9 Still others call
it “educational” and “informational.”10 These different conceptualizations
highlight how ill-defined the scope of the industry is.11 This is important
because the different ways in which the industry is understood militate
toward different modes of regulating the communication and interpretation
of genomic test results that consumers receive.
The traditional model for disseminating personal biological information
depends solely on members of the medical profession.12 Today, however,
the growing trend has been for individuals to make more choices

Id. (alteration in original). At the time, this false statement, coupled with Carrel’s maniacal
ethos for white supremacy and the sensational reports surrounding Carrel’s work, damaged
the public image of cell culturing. See id. at 59–62. It took time for the public to recover
and recognize the beneficial uses for cell culturing, including now-common vaccines for
viruses. See id. at 98. This example from history reminds us to approach new technologies
with a sober, reasoned perspective.
7. Stein, supra note 1. But see Paula Tironi, Pharmaceutical Pricing: A Review
of Proposals To Improve Access and Affordability of Prescription Drugs, 19 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 311, 313 (2010) (“Drug manufacturers are threatened by developments in
personalized medicine because genetic testing for drug effectiveness could lead to a
smaller market share for their products.”). In considering the controversy surrounding
DTC genetic testing, one must not forget about personal interests, such as Tironi describes,
that are at stake.
8. Andrea Mechanick Braverman, How the Internet Is Reshaping Assisted
Reproduction: From Donor Offspring Registries to Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing,
11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 477, 494 (2010) (quoting Jane Kaye, The Regulation of
Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Tests, 17 HUM. MOLECULAR GENETICS 180, 180 (2008))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
9. See Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing and the Consequences to the Public
Health: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 67 (2010) [hereinafter DTC Hearing] (statement of
Rep. Bart Stupak, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations) (preliminary
transcript on file with the San Diego Law Review) (asking if sending a bag of
supplements based on genetic test results is the practice of medicine); EnergyCommerce,
July 22, 2010—A Hearing on “Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing & Consequences to
Public Health,” YOUTUBE (July 20, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player
_embedded&v=_c0YfMbz6F0 (posting video coverage of the hearing).
10. DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 76, 95 (statement of Ashley Gould, General
Counsel, 23andMe).
11. See SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., U.S. SYSTEM OF OVERSIGHT OF GENETIC TESTING: A RESPONSE
TO THE CHARGE OF THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 51 tbl.2-2 (2008)
[hereinafter SACGHS REPORT], available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/SACGHS/reports/
SACGHS_oversight_report.pdf (outlining gaps in genetic testing oversight).
12. Braverman, supra note 8, at 494.

282

[VOL. 49: 279, 2012]

Age of an Information Revolution
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

independent of medical providers.13 One explanation for this trend is
that patients are reconceptualizing themselves as consumers.14 This trend is
not so surprising given the American penchant for individual autonomy
and free-market ideals.15 Individuals want to know more about their
biology, and with advances in genetics, technology, and the rise of the
Internet, they now have affordable, ready access to part of their genomic
data.16 Most fittingly, the search to uncover the secrets of one’s own
unique genomic data is the pinnacle of the American individualist

13. Id. at 493–94; see also Allyson M. Rucinski, Note, Finding the Middle
Ground: Acuna v. Turkish and the New Jersey Supreme Court’s Reaffirmation of a
Doctor’s Role Under the Doctrine of Informed Consent in the Digital Age, 29 PACE L.
REV. 797, 797 (2009) (“With information readily available at the touch of a button,
people are constantly using the Internet to read about their medical conditions, diagnose
their symptoms, discover new medical breakthroughs, and even obtain a list of potential
medications. The days of a doctor being a patient’s primary source for medical
information are gone.”).
14. See Janet L. Dolgin, The Evolution of the “Patient”: Shifts in Attitudes About
Consent, Genetic Information, and Commercialization in Health Care, 34 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 137, 175 (2005).
15. See id. at 175–77; see also Tamir, supra note 4, at 213 (noting DTC testing is
seen by some individuals “as an enabling tool for exercising one’s autonomous quest for
personal health information”). This trend has also arisen against the backdrop of a
collective conceptual shift in the institutional architecture of medicine from close
relationships with compassionate family physicians to large and impersonal health care
conglomerates. Dolgin, supra note 14, at 140–41; see also Darnovsky, supra note 4, at
100–01 (discussing the political conflicts involved in cutting-edge technologies such as
stem cell research). Darnovsky writes:
Unfortunately, two currents in recent liberal and progressive thought leave us
ill equipped for these challenges. One is a tendency to embrace technological
and scientific developments without adequate attention to the risks they pose
and the deep impact that they can have on our politics and culture. The other
is a reluctance to directly address moral controversies, especially when
strongly held religious beliefs are in play.
Id. Perhaps these kinds of political conflicts and interests are at play in the reluctance to
see the long-sacred domain of physicians encroached upon by outsiders.
16. Contrast this model, which is at the heart of the capitalist ideal, to the model of
current healthcare. See Rick J. Carlson, Preemptive Public Policy for Genomics,
33 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 39, 47 (2008). Carlson discusses his view of how the
healthcare infrastructure developed, stating that employer-financed healthcare, Medicare,
and Medicaid have essentially “lock[ed] us into a delivery system free from public
monitoring.” Id. Essentially, he says, we took a deal for healthcare—as it then stood—
in exchange for employment, and then we made another deal with providers, and this is
how it stayed thereafter. Id. The DTC genetic testing industry offers the promise of
personalized medicine of the future, which, if shaped by strong public policy decisions,
could be a closer realization of free-market ideals. See id. at 50. As the current state of
healthcare is in flux, it remains to be seen what new architecture of healthcare shall
emerge from the partisan rubble.
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ideal.17 However, this path of consumer freedom is fraught with new
challenges.18 Aspects of the DTC industry, including the communication
and interpretation of such tests, are largely unregulated, leading consumers
to risk receiving incorrect, even fraudulent, information from those who
may want to exploit the persuasive power that scientific information
tends to have on lay individuals.19
In order to safeguard consumers and ensure the continued progress of
a fledgling industry, determining how to interpret results and communicate
them with consumers poses one of the most challenging and important
tasks. In discussing the challenges the law faces in this area, this Comment
will discuss: (1) consumer interfacing issues, such as in advertising and
results analysis, faced by the genetic testing industry; (2) the methods
DTC companies use in arriving at results and corresponding problems;
(3) who may interpret and communicate results; (4) how the DTC genetic
testing industry’s activities relate to the claims made regarding test
results; and (5) who should bear the burden of responsibility. Finally,
this Comment recommends a holistic approach that would take into
account regulatory, legislative, self-regulatory, and educational methods
to making the DTC genetic testing industry safer, more reliable, and
poised to incorporate future advances in knowledge and technology.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Cruelest Months20
The summer of 2010 heralded a new chapter in the genomics era and
the corresponding rising legal issues that must be confronted. In May
17. Braverman, supra note 8, at 493.
18. See, e.g., Rucinski, supra note 13, at 797 (comparing how, in the past, the medical
community deferred all medical decisionmaking to doctors because it considered patients
ignorant of medicine and how, now, there is a paradigm shift in that the “reasonable
patient” is now the “informed consumer”).
19. See, e.g., Giovanni Frazzetto, The Science of Online Dating, 11 EMBO REP.
25, 25 (2010). GenePartner.com and ScientificMatch.com have taken advantage of the
rise of DTC genetic testing to build businesses based on matching people with
compatible genetic material and neurochemistry. Id. Needless to say, ignoring the traditional
elements of falling in love has cast a suspicious shadow on these companies’ minimalist
reduction of human courtship.
20. When considering the events of summer 2010, even though it was not springtime,
I was reminded of T.S. Eliot’s poem The Waste Land, which begins:
April is the cruelest month, breeding
Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing
Memory and desire, stirring
Dull roots with spring rain.
T.S. ELIOT, The Waste Land, in THE WASTE LAND AND OTHER WRITINGS 38, 38 (2001)
(1922). The themes of birth, death, and turmoil seemed especially apt; therefore, I owe
my inspiration—even flight of fancy—to Eliot.
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2010, Pathway Genomics announced in partnership with Walgreens that
it would offer over-the-counter, do-it-yourself genetic testing kits.21
This was to be the first such test available to the general public for
purchase from a drug store.22 It was thought that the tests would likely
popularize genetic tests in a way never before seen.23 Alarmed, the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) sent a warning letter in response
prohibiting the arrangement and stating that these kits were medical
devices requiring premarket FDA approval.24 The FDA then sent letters
to 23andMe, Navigenics Health Compass, deCODE Genetics, and fourteen
other DTC genetic testing companies, notifying them that these tests fell
under the FDA definition of a “medical device.”25
Then, in June 2010, personal genomics company 23andMe announced
that a mix-up at its lab resulted in ninety-six customers’ receiving results
based on genetic data belonging to other customers.26 Even though this
seems like the ultimate failure in accurate communication—not to mention
a potential privacy-breach nightmare—many customers expressed that
they would not prefer more regulation, fearing loss of consumer
21. DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 12–15 (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman,
Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations).
22. Andrew Pollack, Walgreens Delays Selling Personal Genetic Test Kit, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 2010, at B5.
23. See id. (noting that selling DTC genetic tests over the counter would make them
more accessible).
24. DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 15 (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman,
Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations); see also Lauren B. Solberg,
Over the Counter but Under the Radar: Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Tests and FDA
Regulation of Medical Devices, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 711, 718 (2009) (noting that by
2009, while the FDA claimed it was “within its statutory mandate to regulate [DTC]
genetic tests,” it had declined to do so yet (citing Who Regulates Genetic Tests?, GENETICS &
PUB. POL’Y CENTER (Feb. 27, 2006), http://www.dnapolicy.org/policy.issue.php?action
=detail&issuebrief_id=10)). As of 2010, the FDA has taken a more active role, but the
scope of its power remains unclear. See infra note 282.
25. DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 15 (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman,
Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations).
26. Alejandro Martínez-Cabrera, Lab Mix-Up Exposes Potential Dangers, S.F.
CHRON., June 11, 2010, at A1, available at 2010 WLNR 11915507. This is not the first
time these companies have been sent letters of alarm. See Tamir, supra note 4, at 234.
In June 2008, the state of California’s Department of Public Health sent warning letters
to thirteen DTC genetic testing companies warning them that offering these tests without
a physician’s order ran contrary to California law. Id. The companies are still in
business today because they were required to comply with California’s laws regarding
testing performance, obtain licensing from California’s Department of Public Health, and
obtain Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act (CLIA) certification. Id. This still does not
address the need for clear, robust guidelines regarding interpretation and communication
of results.
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independence and potential rising, prohibitive cost.27 Others voiced concern
regarding overly paternalistic treatment by the government and opposed
placing doctors and genetic counselors between customers and their
genomic data, believing that customers are capable of self-policing the
results; after all, they were the ones who caught the 23andMe results
mix-up in the first place.28
Although many consumers feel they have a right to freely access their
own genomes, the federal government and members of the medical field
have been harsh critics. 29 The government’s concern stems from
investigations revealing troubling practices. On July 22, 2010, the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations for the Committee on
Energy and Commerce held a hearing on DTC genetic testing and the
consequences to public health.30 Centrally highlighted at the hearing, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted an investigation
into the practices of some DTC genetic testing companies, and the
investigation showed disturbing quality-control issues, inconsistent
interpretive standards, and even fraud. 31 The GAO had initiated the
investigation to determine the accuracy of statements regarding results
and advertisements made by DTC companies, and its findings indicate a
need for change.32
Amid the firestorm of controversy battering the DTC genetic testing
industry, another blow capped off the summer, coming from an unexpected
place. The University of California, Berkeley sought to initiate the first
mass voluntary genetic testing program for the incoming freshman class
of 2014.33 The program, called “Bring Your Genes to Cal,” sought to
27. Martínez-Cabrera, supra note 26 (“It’s taking away power from consumers and
putting it where it’s always been . . . .” (quoting 23andMe customer CeCe Moore) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
28. Id.
29. Aaron Saenz, Genetic Testing Mix-Up at 23andMe, Another Blow to the
Industry, SINGULARITY HUB (June 9, 2010), http://singularityhub.com/2010/06/09/genetictesting-mix-up-at-23andme-another-blow-to-the-industry/.
30. See generally DTC Hearing, supra note 9.
31. See GREGORY KUTZ, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-847T,
DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER GENETIC TESTS: MISLEADING TEST RESULTS ARE FURTHER
COMPLICATED BY DECEPTIVE MARKETING AND OTHER QUESTIONABLE PRACTICES (2010)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10847t.pdf
(revealing, for example, that DNA submitted by one undercover investigator to four
DTC companies yielded four different risk-prediction results regarding some of the same
diseases).
32. Id.; see infra Part VII.B.3.
33. See Victoria Colliver, Ethics of DNA Tests for Students Questioned, S.F.
CHRON., May 21, 2010, at C1, available at 2010 WLNR 10512685. But see Larry Gordon,
UC Berkeley’s Plan To Test DNA Sparks Debate, L.A. TIMES, June 1, 2010, at AA1
(reporting that some dispute the voluntariness of the program because students may feel
pressured to conform with peers who decide to participate and may also not want to risk
alienating future professors).

286

[VOL. 49: 279, 2012]

Age of an Information Revolution
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

educate students about the promise of personalized medicine and to help
students learn more about themselves.34 The program would test for three
genes associated with alcohol metabolism, folate absorption, and lactose
metabolism.35 Even though the chosen genes were relatively “innocuous”
and many supporters defended the program, outcry over privacy concerns
and the fear that students would modify their behaviors negatively based
on results, such as by drinking more alcohol, fueled a backlash from
opposing groups.36 The genes were chosen not to uncover serious health
risks but with an eye toward nutritional genomics.37 About 700 students
voluntarily signed up for the program and submitted samples through the
mail.38
On June 24, 2010, California’s Senate Education Committee defeated
a bill that would have expressly circumscribed all University of California
and Cal State schools’ ability to seek and use students’ DNA.39 However,
before the students could receive their results, the California Department
of Health and Public Safety prohibited the University from providing
individualized results to the students, asserting that the program
amounted to medical research and needed to be conducted in a licensed
laboratory, not by University technicians.40 As a result, U.C. Berkeley
34. See Victoria Colliver, DNA Program Altered, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 13, 2010, at
C1, available at 2010 WLNR 16146856.
35. See Colliver, supra note 33.
36. See Tamar Lewin, College Bound, DNA Swab in Hand, N.Y. TIMES, May 19,
2010, at A14 (reporting that although most U.C. Berkeley professors viewed the testing
as harmless, some others, such as bioethicist George Annas of Boston University,
viewed all genetic testing as potentially harmful); see also Editorial, Bonding at Berkeley
via DNA, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 2010, at A14 (reporting that U.C. Berkeley took
extraordinary precautions in allowing students to opt out and taking steps to maintain
confidentiality—yet still advocating that learning something potentially uncomfortable is
not a reason to shield students from information about themselves).
37. Lewin, supra note 36. The study was aimed at encouraging students to drink
less, eat more leafy greens, and, if applicable, avoid dairy consumption. Id.
38. See Victoria Colliver, DNA Test Flip-Flop Stirs Debate at Cal, S.F. CHRON.,
Aug. 28, 2010, at C1, available at 2010 WLNR 17137289.
39. See A.B. 70, 2009–2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009) (introducing, at
the request of Assembly member Norby, that the bill be put into effect immediately
because of U.C. Berkeley’s proposed genetic testing program); Lewin, supra note 36.
40. Larry Gordon, Genetic Testing of Freshmen Cut Back, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13,
2010, at AA1; see Colliver, supra note 38. U.C. Berkeley had planned to have the samples
analyzed through its own laboratories. Lewin, supra note 36. The participating students
would be assigned a barcode and receive results anonymously through a website. Gordon,
supra note 33. The samples would be destroyed afterward. Id. The University also
planned on offering more detailed analyses through commercial companies as prizes for
participation in a personalized medicine essay contest. Id. Despite these seemingly
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modified its program to present results only in aggregate to those students
who had already submitted samples.41
This brief foray into DNA testing and education implicates the need
for better guidelines on how such test results may be presented.42 Up
until now, such DNA testing had not been introduced into the educational
sphere, but it may become more of an issue as DTC genetic testing
companies become more established.43 Aside from the obvious privacy
concerns inherent in DNA testing,44 the most fundamental issue is
exactly how professionals should present these results to consumers,
students, and others. Companies and professionals must use sufficient
methods to communicate results in order to ensure consumers do not
conflate risk prediction with reports merely indicating the existence or
nonexistence of a genetic variant.45
benign intentions, the director of the University of Pennsylvania’s Center for Bioethics,
Arthur L. Caplan, said that although he supports the program, it would have been better
if the results were received through one-on-one counseling rather than through a website.
Id.
41. See Gordon, supra note 40.
42. Although the crossroads of DTC genetic testing and academia is not the focus
of this Comment, it is important to shed light on it for a few reasons. First, it shows why
a holistic and flexible approach is needed because only such an approach will enable
lawmakers to meet novel problems. Second, it is important to understand, broadly, how
constantly and rapidly the science is developing and how public demand for this
technology is growing.
43. The kind of genetic testing that aims to teach by using students, themselves, as
the subjects of genetics-based course material is distinct from the myriad of other
possible uses of genetic material in an academic or research setting. See, e.g., Greenberg
v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1069–70 (S.D.
Fla. 2003) (holding that a medical researcher who is not therapeutically treating a patient
owes no duty of informed consent for commercial use of biological samples taken from
patients before patenting a gene discovered to be the source of disease); Joe Fore, Moving
Beyond “Gene Doping”: Preparing for Genetic Modification in Sport, 15 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 76 (2010) (discussing the problem of gene doping in sports); Debra L. Greenfield,
Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital: Unjust Enrichment and the Patenting of Human
Genetic Material, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 213 (2006) (discussing the problem and boundaries
of informed consent and patenting of products of research from human genetic material);
Amy Harmon, Dispute Highlights Risks in Use of Genetic Material, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
22, 2010, at A17 (discussing a dispute between the Havasupai Indians and Arizona State
University regarding blood samples taken and analyzed for genetic disorders without
fully informed consent).
44. See generally Sara Abiola, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of
2008: “First Major Civil Rights Bill of the Century” Bars Misuse of Genetic Test Results, 36
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 856 (2008); Perry W. Payne, Jr., Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act of 2008: The Federal Answer for Genetic Discrimination, 5 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L.
33 (2009).
45. See generally Lucia A. Hindorff et al., Potential Etiologic and Functional
Implications of Genome-Wide Association Loci for Human Diseases and Traits, 106
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9362 (2009) (discussing genome-wide association studies
(GWAS) and trait-disease associations). It is important to consider the difference between
using an association as an explicit predictor of disease as opposed to simply noting the
association.
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III. THE SPARSE LEGAL LANDSCAPE TODAY
A. The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act:
The First Step
Little legal guidance currently exists regarding the communication of
genetic test results.46 Although biotechnology and science have progressed
rapidly in the recent past, the law has been slow to catch up.47 In 2008,
Congress took the first step in regulating genetic information when it
passed the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), cosponsored
by Senators Edward Kennedy and Olympia Snowe and signed into law
by former President Bush.48 Senator Kennedy went so far as to say that
“GINA is the first major new civil rights bill of the new century.”49 The
legislation is quite narrow in scope, however.50 GINA is narrowly tailored
to eliminating discrimination based on genetic information by privateand public-sector employers, employment agencies, and insurance
companies.51 The legislation delineates how employers can use and store
genetic information and prohibits insurance companies from basing
eligibility and premium rates on test results.52 Highlighting the extent of
GINA’s narrow scope, even within the targeted domain of insurance,
GINA does not prevent discrimination in the areas of long-term medical
care and disability insurance.53 Specifically, GINA protects individuals
46. Lee Black et al., Genetic Testing, Physicians and the Law: Will the Tortoise
Ever Catch Up with the Hare?, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 115, 118 (2010).
47. See, e.g., id. at 118–19.
48. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122
Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.); Kathy L.
Hudson, M.K. Holohan & Francis S. Collins, Keeping Pace with the Times—The Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2661, 2661 (2008);
see also H.R. 493, 110th Cong. (2008) (enacted) (giving background information
describing the legislators’ motivations).
49. Hudson et al., supra note 48, at 2662 (quoting U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
50. Lauren Elizabeth Nuffort, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of
2008: Raising a Shield to Genetic Discrimination in Employment and Health Insurance,
HEALTH LAW., June 2009, at 1, 16 (noting that it remains to be seen whether the gap left
in GINA regarding life insurance, disability insurance, and long-term care will result in
discrimination).
51. Daniel Schlein, New Frontiers for Genetic Privacy Law: The Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 311, 313 (2009).
52. Id.
53. Amy Foster, Comment, Critical Dilemmas in Genetic Testing: Why Regulations To
Protect the Confidentiality of Genetic Information Should Be Expanded, 62 BAYLOR L.
REV. 537, 538 (2010); see also Bruce Patsner, New “Home Brew” Predictive Genetic
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and their medical data—which could indicate predispositions toward
certain illnesses—by prohibiting discrimination through use or solicitation
of such data only in the above-named few categories.54
Aimed at protecting privacy and preventing discrimination, certainly
worthy goals, the legislation left a gaping hole in regulation regarding
any other use of genomic information.55 Notably, GINA does not indicate
how genetic tests such as those employed by DTC genetic testing
companies should be interpreted and communicated.56 For this reason,
it is important for Congress to galvanize the industry, academics, and
regulatory agencies to work together in better structuring the industry by
extending the legislation GINA started. This would be a preemptive
move to setting up a new legal structure and will head off the temptation
to solve problems only ad hoc.57
B. Federal Agencies and the Lack of Defined Authority
Although federal regulation and guidance seem necessary, it is unclear
which agency should lead the charge.58 Two federal agencies share
jurisdiction over regulating DTC tests; however, the boundaries of each
agency’s purview are too ill-defined to efficiently take on this challenge.59

Tests Present Significant Regulatory Problems, 9 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 237, 263
(2009) (“GINA does not apply to life insurance, disability insurance, [and] long-term
insurance . . . . Nor do GINA’s health insurance provisions apply to people who are
symptomatic or to ‘non-genetic’ predictive testing and information (also known as
epigenetics).” (footnote omitted) (citing 122 Stat. 881)).
54. Sagit Ziskind, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act: A New Look at
an Old Problem, 35 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 163, 163–64 (2009).
55. SACGHS REPORT, supra note 11, at 51 tbl.2-2.
56. Congress likely could see the potential for serious constitutional problems on
the horizon—what it did not address, the courts would have to muddle through alone.
See, for example, Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab, 135 F.3d 1260, 1264–
65 (9th Cir. 1998), in which several employees challenged employment preplacement
exams conducted by the University of California laboratory. The preplacement exams
were aimed at uncovering markers for syphilis, pregnancy, and sickle-cell anemia. Id.
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that such tests were nonconsensual because they were
required for employment and were targeted at women and African-Americans. Id. at
1272–73.
57. See Payne, supra note 44, at 58–59. GINA was in part a response to accounts
of discrimination. Id. at 40–41. One example of such discrimination was sickle-cell
anemia research conducted on African-Americans without their consent. Id. at 40.
Employment discrimination against railroad workers, who were genetically tested
without their consent, also spurred on Congress to draft GINA. Id. at 40–41.
58. Andrew S. Robertson, Taking Responsibility: Regulations and Protections in
Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 213, 221–22 (2009).
59. See DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 14 (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman,
Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations). Furthermore, if there is a
question as to whether deliberately false or misleading claims are being made, the
Federal Trade Commission would need to step in. See infra Part VII.B.3.
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The Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act of 1988 (CLIA) endows the
Centers for Medicaid or Medicare Services (CMS) with the power to
regulate the laboratories conducting DTC genetic tests.60 It is not within
the purview of the CMS, however, to regulate communications DTC
companies make to consumers based on such tests.61 The FDA, on the
other hand, has the power to regulate diagnostic tests considered to be
medical devices.62 Unlike the CMS, the FDA can regulate communications,
for instance those made through television commercials and labeling,
but it can regulate claims related to DTC tests only if they are
categorized as medical devices.63 Presently, it is still unclear whether
these tests fall under the definition of a medical device.64 The FDA’s
role is potentially further limited by the categorization of DTC genetic
tests as “laboratory-developed tests” (LDT), which the FDA does not
automatically have the authority to regulate.65 CMS regulates these tests

60. Molly C. Novy, Note, Privacy at a Price: Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing
& the Need for Regulation, 2010 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 157, 173 (2010) (discussing
how CLIA governs certification of laboratories but “CLIA is not considered particularly
on point for genetic testing as it ‘does not address clinical validity or claims made by the
laboratory regarding the tests’” (quoting ASHG Statement on Direct-to-Consumer
Genetic Testing in the United States, 81 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 635, 636 (2007))); see
DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 14 (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, H.
Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations).
61. DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 14 (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman,
Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations) (“Under the Clinical Laboratory
Improvement Act, CLIA, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, CMS, regulates
the laboratories that conduct the testing but not the health claims made by genetic testing
manufacturers.”); see also Novy, supra note 60, at 173–74 (noting that CMS had
considered creating a specialty category for regulating genetic testing but abandoned the
idea in 2006).
62. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2006); DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 14 (statement of
Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations).
63. 21 U.S.C. § 352(r) (2006).
64. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(h); DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 14 (statement of Rep.
Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations). For a
contrary and recent statement by the FDA that these tests do qualify as medical devices,
see the numerous letters sent to various DTC genetic testing companies in June 2010.
See In Vitro Diagnostics, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/
ProductsandMedicalProcedures/InVitroDiagnostics/default.htm (last updated Jan. 25,
2012) (hosting the numerous letters sent to various DTC genetic testing companies).
65. Solberg, supra note 24, at 711. In contrast, “test kits” are developed independent of
the laboratories that use them and are not directly available to consumers; these tests are
FDA-governed. Id. Except for one specific kind of laboratory-developed test (LDT)
meant for diagnosing, treating, or preventing a group of specific diseases that the FDA
has definite authority to oversee, Robertson, supra note 58, at 223 n.66, the FDA has
only “enforcement discretion” as to LDTs developed in-house, id. at 223–24.
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pursuant to the CLIA.66 This means that, in most cases, these
laboratory-developed tests are not subject to premarket FDA review
before reaching the public.67
With the involvement of the GAO and FDA in the most recent 2010
congressional subcommittee hearing, Congress seemed to imply that the
FDA is best suited to lead the charge.68 However, other key players, such as
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), industry leaders, and academics,
should also play a role in fashioning an appropriate response to the
regulatory problem.
DTC genetic tests occupy a gray area under the purview of these
regulatory agencies. For that reason, any amendment to GINA that extends
its scope must both recognize the necessity of these various agencies’
collective, collaborative action and fashion a new category in which
some of the risk-predictive testing clearly falls under FDA and FTC
authority.69
IV. CURRENT SHORTCOMINGS IN INDUSTRY:
CONSUMER INTERFACING
A. The Government Accountability Office’s Sting Operation
No matter which agency ends up leading the charge in regulating
industry standards, agency officials will find no shortage of claims made
by unscrupulous companies requiring vigilant handling. The July 2010
congressional hearing on the DTC practices highlighted several of the
communicative problems inherent in the industry that are potentially
harmful to consumers.70 The hearing discussed the results of a joint
effort, initiated in 2009, between members of the Energy and Commerce

66. Robertson, supra note 58, at 221–22.
67. Patsner, supra note 53, at 254–55. See generally Rebecca Antar Novick, Note,
One Step at a Time: Ethical Barriers to Home Genetic Testing and why the U.S. Health
Care System Is Not Ready, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 621 (2008) (discussing in
detail the regulatory bodies and functions).
68. See infra Part IV.C.
69. See, e.g., Amy L. McGuire et al., Regulating Direct-to-Consumer Personal
Genome Testing, 330 SCIENCE 181, 181 (2010). Companies can forgo premarket FDA
review by sending their LDTs to CLIA-certified laboratories. Id. To circumvent FDA
review, a laboratory can use its own LDTs but cannot sell them to other laboratories. Id.
FDA premarket review requires data-driven review for most tests introduced into the
market, but the business model used by these companies may preclude such review. Id.
This prevents a baseline assurance of quality throughout the DTC genetic testing industry that
other drugs and medical devices must attain. See id.
70. To hear recorded audio of part of the GAO’s sting operation, highlighting
some of the more egregious offenses, see Usgao, GAO: Undercover Contact with Directto-Consumer Genetic Testing Companies, YOUTUBE (July 22, 2010), http://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=VJpN7-x3iSM&autoplay=1&rel=0&showinfo=0.
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Committee and the GAO to investigate the practices of the genetic
testing industry.71 What the GAO discovered was disturbing.
First, the GAO report revealed potential false advertising problems.72
Online, television, or print advertisements are usually among the first
communications that DTC genetic testing companies have with
members of the public, and these advertisements may have a powerful
effect on consumers.73 These initial communications are critical because
the claims that DTC genetic testing companies make to attract customers
frame and delimit the scope of their businesses.74 Regarding fraudulent or
misleading advertising, the FTC would be the appropriate agency to
police the bounds of claims made by DTC companies.75 It is within FTC
purview to regulate the unfair and deceptive practices relating to
commercial activity and advertising.76 However, aside from publishing a
warning pamphlet for consumers, the FTC has yet to initiate an
enforcement action against any of these companies.77
Some of the claims made by certain companies have been egregious.
For example, one company claimed it would tailor a nutritional supplement
based on submitted DNA that would cure arthritis and prevent high
cholesterol.78 Not only was this claim absolutely false but the representative
told the customer he could eventually stop taking his physician-prescribed
cholesterol medication.79 A representative from the same company told

71. DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 4 (statement of Rep. Bart Stupak, Chairman, H.
Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations).
72. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 31, at 15–16 tbl.2 (giving examples of
deceptive marketing, misinformation, and questionable practices).
73. See Mark Bartholomew, Advertising and Social Identity, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 931,
943 (2010) (discussing the history of critics’ view of how powerful advertising works
upon the consumer’s mind and how it, in some ways, even may shape our identities).
74. But see id. at 934 (discussing how the effects of advertising are likely a
combination of both the message the advertiser hopes to convey and the message that the
consumer subjectively reinvents).
75. See DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 64 (statement of Dr. Jeffrey Shuren,
Director, Center for Device and Radiological Health with the Food and Drug
Administration).
76. KATHERINE DRABIAK-SYED, IND. UNIV. CTR. FOR BIOETHICS, DIRECT-TOCONSUMER GENETIC TESTING (DTC): PREDICTER LAW AND POLICY UPDATE (2010),
available at http://bioethics.iu.edu/index.php/download_file/view/87/.
77. Id. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, AT-HOME GENETIC TESTS: A HEALTHY
DOSE OF SKEPTICISM MAY BE THE BEST PRESCRIPTION (2006), available at http://www.
ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/health/hea02.pdf.
78. GAO REPORT, supra note 31, at 15 tbl.2.
79. Id. at 15–16 tbl.2. Another company claimed, falsely, that its tests and related
products could repair damaged DNA. Id. at 16 tbl.2.

293

another undercover customer that Michael Phelps endorsed the company’s
tests and that the company was in talks with Lance Armstrong because
his doctors thought the tests were “the most amazing thing they [had]
ever seen.”80 These claims were also absolutely false—representatives
for both Phelps and Armstrong stated that they had not even heard of the
company before.81 It is important here to differentiate between the
bottom-feeders in the industry and those that are respected leaders.82
Not all DTC companies engage in this kind of blatant deception, and the
kinds of claims that companies make do vary.83 The purpose of regulation
should be to snuff out charlatans and set a single high standard for the
remainder.
Second, the investigation revealed problems about the uniformity of
the results. A secret shopper submitted DNA samples to three separate
companies, and the same person received three different risk predictions
for prostate cancer and hypertension.84 The standard of review and
analysis of samples, the approaches, and the results are, unsurprisingly,
inconsistent because the DTC industry does not have uniform regulations to
follow.85 However, if risk predictions are to survive government scrutiny,
the finding highlights the need for a consistent set of standards or, at the

80. Id. at 15 tbl.2.
81. Id.
82. See, for example, Joyce Y. Tung et al., Efficient Replication of Over 180 Genetic
Associations with Self-Reported Medical Data, PLOS ONE, at 2, 3 figs.1 & 5 (Aug. 17, 2011),
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0023473, for a
study published in a peer-reviewed scientific journal in which 23andMe researchers used
customer samples, with permission, and self-reported surveys regarding disease status to
effectively replicate 180 genetic associations in a genome-wide association study. In
another peer-reviewed publication, 23andMe researchers teamed up with the Parkinson’s
Institute and presented findings from the largest GWAS for Parkinson’s disease to
date—using data derived from its customer base—that revealed two previously unknown
genetic associations for Parkinson’s. Chuong B. Do et al., Web-Based Genome-Wide
Association Study Identifies Two Novel Loci and a Substantial Genetic Component for
Parkinson’s Disease, PLOS GENETICS, 1–2 (June 23, 2011), http://www.plosgenetics.org/
article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pgen.1002141. In effect, the DTC genetic testing 23andMe is
a hybrid: it not only provides consumers with a commercial service but also conducts
research with consumer data, contributing to the body of scholarly scientific literature.
Hybridization of this kind provides a beneficial model for the future of the industry.
83. See GAO REPORT, supra note 31, at 15–16 tbl.2 (summarizing the types of
claims a variety of companies made during the GAO’s sting operation).
84. DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 10 (statement of Rep. Michael C. Burgess).
85. See, e.g., id. at 93–94 (statement of Ashley Gould, General Counsel, 23andMe).
General counsel for 23andMe, Ashley Gould, agreed that consistent standards were
needed across companies and explained that the reason why different DTC companies might
reach different results was because predictive models that each company used were based on
different standards. Id. Gould further explained that companies varied regarding which
single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) they look for and what weight they give to any
SNPs. Id. Moreover, she noted there were differences regarding which variants can be
tested among the technologies implemented by various companies. Id.
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very least, transparent disclaimers and understandable information about
the way in which each company comes to its conclusions.86
B. Medical History and Risk Prediction
The 2010 congressional hearing also discussed how a person’s actual
medical history sometimes did not match up with the risk prediction
given for a condition.87 It is important to note that this does not
necessarily indicate shoddy science or methodology—a risk prediction is
not synonymous with a diagnosis.88 However, the finding highlights the
need to effectively communicate what a risk prediction does and does
not tell the consumer and also to offer the consumer an opportunity to
opt out of receiving certain information that may be too upsetting.89
This would best protect against miscommunication.
86. At least one company has published online material detailing how it arrives at
results. See For Scientists: White Papers, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/for/scien
tists/#whitepapers (last visited Mar. 6, 2012). Perhaps such disclosure should be required for
all companies. Federal agencies could also look to what they have done in other industries.
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(ff), 343 (2006); Jennifer A. Gniady, Note, Regulating Direct-toConsumer Genetic Testing: Protecting the Consumer Without Quashing a Medical
Revolution, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2429, 2453 (2008) (describing the FTC’s decision to
require disclaimers in the dietary supplement industry).
87. See DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 6 (statement of Rep. Bart Stupak,
Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations) (expressing concern regarding a
report that a donor in the GAO investigation received a report for prediction of decreased
risk for heart disease when in actuality, he had a pacemaker implanted fourteen years ago
to treat an irregular heartbeat).
88. See Teri A. Manolio, Genomewide Association Studies and Assessment of the
Risk of Disease, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 166, 166 (2010) (noting that the manifestation of
a disease—or complex trait—is due to a number of factors, including genetic and
environmental factors, and that it may well be that no single factor need be required in
every manifestation). To see an example of the confusion surrounding the difference
between mere presence of a variant versus a diagnosis, see GAO REPORT, supra note 31.
The GAO wrote in its report that the sting operation participants received “disease risk
predictions that conflicted with their actual medical conditions”; for instance, a donor
reported that he was told he was at decreased risk for heart disease when he already had
a pacemaker. Id. Although companies need to rethink using “risk” verbiage, it is critical
to realize that mere presence of a variant does not automatically lead to a set-in-stone
diagnosis that one will or will not get a disease or condition in the future. See infra
Part V. Therefore, we must move away from oversimplification, and we must move
toward developing appropriate verbiage to accurately communicate what these tests
suggest. The easiest way to do this, of course, is to simply avoid “risk” verbiage and
communicate only strict facts.
89. For a discussion on the “right not to know,” see Tamir, supra note 4, at 228–
29. Tamir discusses how the general public is often unaware of the dangers of being
exposed to genetic information that is revealing and predictive, but “probabilistic” as
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Another aspect of DTC genetic testing companies is that they may
implicitly appear to suggest taking or not taking particular drugs based
on the presence of genetic variants that have been linked to particular
favorable or unfavorable reactions to drugs.90 Although the revolutionary
frontier in terms of personalized medicine will likely have its biggest
impact in the area of drug predictions to tailor medical treatment for
patients, the state of the science is not ready yet.91 Thus, even though
association data should be acceptable, it is problematic if a consumer
could interpret the results to mean that a commercial company is
suggesting taking or not taking a drug merely based on associations
between genetic variants.92

well. Id. Many companies do not offer the option to essentially opt out of knowing such
information, which deprives them of the right not to know. See id. However, some
companies such as 23andMe offer an opportunity to opt out of knowing results for
certain genetic variant reports by having the user click “see report.” See Shwu, Health at
23andMe: Navigating Your Health Results, SPITTOON (Dec. 1, 2010, 3:05 PM), http://
spittoon.23andme.com/2010/12/01/health-at-23andme-navigating-your-healthresults/. Although there is no express indication that the company’s purpose in
including this feature was to expressly account for a right not to know, this is likely an
unintended benefit, and the “see report” feature could be more widely implemented
for diseases likely to be particularly devastating to a sensitive individual. See also
Gaia Bernstein, Accommodating Technological Innovation: Identity, Genetic Testing and
the Internet, 57 VAND. L. REV. 965, 987 (2004) (recounting the story of such an
individual). Bernstein recounts the story of a woman in her mid-twenties who got tested
for carrier-status of the neurological disease spinocerebellar ataxia type I, which has a
typical onset of thirty to forty years old. Id. (citing Howard F. Taswell & Susan K
Sholtes, Predictive Genetic Testing: A Story of One Family, 17 FAM. SYS. & HEALTH
111, 115 (1999)). It ran in her family. Id. She ended up being a carrier, and when she
was told that it would result in an immense pain for a period of decades leading up to her
death, it impacted her profoundly. Id. She fell into depression, had trouble holding
down jobs, and resented others who lacked such a formidable burden. Id. This story
shows how much of a serious impact such knowledge can bring. For this reason, creating
an opt-out system would be beneficial for certain diseases.
90. See GAO REPORT, supra note 31, at 15 tbl.2. In its sting operation, the GAO
discovered that one company had told an undercover customer that its nutritional
supplements would cure his arthritis and prevent high cholesterol and blood pressure. Id.
The company representative also told the undercover customer that he could stop taking
his prescription medications once he began the nutritional supplement regimen. Id.
These statements were false and dangerous. Id.
91. Ann K. Daly, Pharmacogenetics and Human Genetic Polymorphisms, 429
BIOCHEMICAL J. 435, 445 (2010).
92. See DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 5 (statement of Rep. Bart Stupak, Chairman, H.
Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations) (describing one website’s suggestion for a
medical team to consider using a certain cancer drug, irinotecan, when genetic markers
may indicate low risk of adverse drug reaction).

296

[VOL. 49: 279, 2012]

Age of an Information Revolution
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

C. Inconsistent Risk-Prediction Standards and the
Need for Uniformity
There have been problems revealed about the manner in which
companies communicated results to consumers and about corresponding
claims that company representatives made to the consumer regarding
results. In one case, even though the company did not test for BRCA1 or
BRCA2, both of which are associated with breast cancer, the company’s
representative told a consumer over the phone that because she received an
above-average risk prediction, she was “in the high risk of pretty much
getting” the disease.93 There are two problems with this statement.
First, the prediction is indisputably inaccurate because BRCA1 and
BRCA2, two genes routinely associated with breast cancer, were not even
tested for.94 This belies a need for consistent standards setting forth
which variants must be tested for to make related claims; otherwise
consumers may receive inaccurate or incomplete information that may
lead to unnecessary tests, surgeries, and life choices—not to mention a
good deal of worry. Second, the representative’s statement shows a
clear case where the communicated result amounts to a diagnosis
because she told the consumer that the risk prediction signified that the
disease would surely manifest.95 In such a case, it is necessary to take
into consideration the kinds of other factors, such as family health
history, best medical practice, and the best interest of the patient’s needs,
which a medical professional has the expertise to consider.96 This type
93. Id. at 10 (statement of Rep. Bart Stupak, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Oversight &
Investigations); Transcript of Undercover Contact with Direct-to-Consumer Genetic
Testing Companies, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (July 22, 2010), http://www.gao.
gov/videofiles/gao_10_847t/gao_10_847t.txt.
94. Katherine L. Nathanson et al., Breast Cancer Genetics: What We Know and
What We Need, 7 NATURE MED. 552, 552 (2001) (“The most widely accepted model of
breast cancer susceptibility is that it is due to a small number of highly penetrant
mutations (such as in BRCA1 and BRCA2) and much larger number of low-penetrance
variants.” (footnote omitted)); see also Alan E. Guttmacher & Francis S. Collins,
Genomic Medicine—A Primer, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1512, 1518 (2002) (discussing
how BRCA1 and BRCA2 are common genes found to increase the risk of breast cancer).
95. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. Mutations in some genes, however,
have a strong effect on manifestation of disease or, in other words, are “highly
penetrant.” Gregory Katz & Stuart O. Schweitzer, Implications of Genetic Testing for
Health Policy, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 90, 99 (2010). Highly penetrant
genetic mutations, such as the mutation that causes cystic fibrosis, ensure a high likelihood
that the disease will manifest. Id.
96. Cynthia Marietta & Amy L. McGuire, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: Is
It the Practice of Medicine?, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 369, 370 (2009).
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of activity should fall to the FDA to regulate because of its inherently
medical nature.97
Congress must ensure that the industry is subject to consistent
standards, and this entails analyzing each component of the industry in
detail. If Congress chooses to allow the FDA to lead the effort in
standardizing the industry, which appears to be its intent,98 then Congress
should ensure that the FDA confers with experts in the scientific and
medical fields as well as leaders in the industry to decide on uniform
standards.99 At a minimum, Congress should work with the FDA to
determine a procedure for establishing variants that must be tested for in
order to make related assertions about what the presence of these variants
means to a consumer. Then, the FDA should work with industry leaders to
put forth standards for how to determine what counts as a low, average,
or high risk prediction.100 This should include the numbers of variants
tested for and how much weight will be given to each variant. The FDA
should also work with these companies to determine which activities are
acceptable. Although recommending that a customer cease taking
medication based on test results and instead take nutritional supplements
is obviously unacceptable, disease-risk and drug-response predictions

97. See SACGHS REPORT, supra note 11, at 28 tbl.2-1 (outlining the potential
various jurisdictions for different DTC genetic testing activities). In addition, it may be
prudent to allow states to play a role in the future by refining any federal standards put
out by establishing specific state tort standards.
98. See DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 11 (statement of Rep. Michael C. Burgess)
(“One might argue that greater Food and Drug Administration regulation of the results is
needed . . . . [T]he FDA convened a public meeting to look at the broader issues of
regulating the developed tests. I do want to hear from the Food and Drug Administration
about their plans.”).
99. Uniformity at the federal level is important because if standards are left only
for states to decide, then it will be impossible to achieve any level of uniformity for an
industry that is inherently an interstate enterprise. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 2(5), 122 Stat. 881, 882–83 (describing a relevant,
parallel concern in its findings prefacing GINA legislation).
Federal law addressing genetic discrimination in health insurance and employment
is incomplete in both the scope and depth of its protections. Moreover, while
many States have enacted some type of genetic non-discrimination law, these
laws vary widely with respect to their approach, application, and level of
protection. Congress has collected substantial evidence that the American public
and the medical community find the existing patchwork of State and Federal
laws to be confusing and inadequate to protect them from discrimination.
Therefore Federal legislation establishing a national and uniform basic standard is
necessary to fully protect the public from discrimination and allay their
concerns about the potential for discrimination, thereby allowing individuals to
take advantage of genetic testing, technologies, research, and new therapies.
Id.; cf. text accompanying notes 96–97 (discussing the importance of the states and the
FDA in the rulemaking process “because of its inherently medical nature”).
100. See McGuire et al., supra note 69, at 182 (noting that a risk-stratification
approach is not currently in place).

298

[VOL. 49: 279, 2012]

Age of an Information Revolution
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

are not so easy to deal with because so much disagreement abounds
regarding whether these activities are truly medical in nature.101
V. THE PROBLEM WITH INTERPRETATION OF GENOME-WIDE
ASSOCIATION STUDIES
A. History of Genome-Wide Association Studies
DTC companies use genome-wide association studies (GWAS) and
candidate gene studies to analyze risk of diseases and drug interactions.102
To understand the interpretive and communicative problems inherent in
the DTC industry, an understanding of how the industry arrives at its
results is necessary. The problems with GWAS are part of what contributes
to the varying interpretations of results that different companies arrive at
for any given variant.103 Also, the vast majority of lower “confidence”104

101. See generally Marietta & McGuire, supra note 96 (discussing whether risk
prediction amounts to the practice of medicine).
102. Quanhe Yang et al., Using Lifetime Risk Estimates in Personal Genomic
Profiles: Estimation of Uncertainty, 85 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 786, 786 (2009).
103. See, e.g., Thomas A. Pearson & Teri A. Manolio, How To Interpret a GenomeWide Association Study, 299 JAMA 1335, 1335 (2008) (discussing the danger of falsepositive results).
104. For the purposes of this Comment, I use the term confidence in the most
general way, as defined by Merriam-Webster to mean “the quality or state of being
certain.” Confidence Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/confidence (last visited Mar. 6, 2012). This means the degree to which
scientists are certain that gene A really is linked to the manifestation of trait a. So the
lower the confidence, the less certain scientists are regarding the relationship between
gene A and trait a. One of the problems inherent in the industry is the nonstandardization of
terms such as confidence. To illustrate why I have chosen to construct a very general
umbrella term, consider the following definitions that are all valid to some extent. The
term confidence in the context of confidence intervals, a term referenced in several
scientific articles on GWAS, points to the statistical relationships—expressed and
arrived at by statistical analyses of genetic information—in GWAS between a gene and a
trait. See generally Hua Zhong & Ross L. Prentice, Bias-Reduced Estimators and Confidence
Intervals for Odds Ratios in Genome-Wide Association Studies, 9 BIOSTATISTICS 621
(2008) (analyzing confidence intervals statistically). One company, 23andMe, uses the
term confidence in yet another way. It expressly points out that it does not discuss
confidence intervals in the statistical context during consumer interfacing, although it
does consider confidence intervals separately as it analyzes data. Mike Macpherson et
al., White Paper 23-01: Estimating Genotype Specific Incidence for One or Several Loci,
23ANDME, https://23andme.https.internapcdn.net/res/pdf/f6Jjz_mcXDI0BTfj-EA9tw_23-03_
Vetting_Genetic_Associations_2011_08.pdf (last revised Aug. 25, 2011); see Brian
Naughton & Shirley Wu, White Paper 23-03: Guidelines on Vetting Genetic Associations,
23ANDME, https://23andme.https.internapcdn.net/res/pdf/f6Jjz_mcXDI0BTfj-EA9tw_23-
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associations between genetic variants and phenotypes (expressed traits)
result from these GWAS as well.105 Only after understanding the underlying
nature of these tests can regulatory agencies and lawmakers arrive at the
best solution to protect consumers as well as the industry.106 With
technological and scientific advances becoming more complex, an
interdisciplinary approach may be necessary for effective and thoughtful
lawmaking.107 Although the DTC genetic testing companies are not
operating illegally,108 these companies need to standardize the way in
which they present results and communicate methods for arriving at results.
One way to accomplish this is for Congress to draft clear definitions that
assign appropriate levels of oversight to the various activities the industry
engages in.109 Understanding how GWAS are used helps determine the
type of information that companies should be required to disclose to the
consumer.
Genome-wide association studies, built upon the foundation of genomics
and genetics, have followed from major milestones like the completion
of the Human Genome Project in 2003, which sequenced and assembled
the entire human genome.110 Genomics approaches trait investigation by
03_Vetting_Genetic_Associations_2011_08.pdf (last revised Aug. 25, 2011). Rather, it
gradates the term confidence in a scale of one-to-four “stars” indicating the following:
A report containing an association derived from a sample size of at least 750
cases is given three gray stars, 100 to 750 cases is given two gray stars, and
fewer than 100 cases is given one gray star. . . . Established Research reports,
which typically contain associations that have been independently replicated in
large studies, are given a ranking of four gold stars.
Id. at 10. Because there are so many ways to understand the term confidence, the bottom
line is that the layman’s understanding of terms such as confidence needs to be at the
forefront of decisionmakers’ minds, and there is a need for standardization in what
exactly this term—just one among many—should mean to consumers.
105. The limitations of GWAS include potential false-positive results, incomplete
understanding of gene function, insensitivity to rare variants, requirement for large
sample size, environmental factors, possible biases for case and control selection, and
genotyping errors. Pearson & Manolio, supra note 103, at 1343.
106. See Vence L. Bonham, Foreword, Living in the Genetic Age: New Issues, New
Challenges, 3 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 9 (2009) (“Living in the genetic and
genomic age clearly presents new issues and challenges for the law, and requires the
legal profession to consider the intersection of law and science in new ways.”).
107. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 373 (2004) (arguing for
a pluralized approach to decisionmaking that celebrates bringing in a diversity of
experience and expertise).
108. See supra Part III.B.
109. See infra Part V.C.
110. All About the Human Genome Project, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST.,
http://www.genome.gov/10001772 (last updated Dec. 13, 2010). Another important
development for the growth of GWAS was the International Research Consortium’s
launch of the International HapMap Project in 2002. Press Release, Nat’l Insts. of Health,
Int’l Consortium Launches Genetic Variation Mapping Project (Oct. 2002), http://www.
genome.gov/10005336. DNA was to be collected from individuals in Nigeria, Japan,
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identifying gene variants and considering how they lead to variation in
gene function and, ultimately, phenotype.111 The human genome consists
of all genetic material in a cell, which means twenty-three pairs of
chromosomes located in the nucleus as well as a small chromosome
located in each mitochondrion.112 Genetics, in contrast, is the study of
how single genes affect traits.113 Genome-wide association studies search
for associations between hundreds or even thousands of genetic
variations, usually single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), and
diseases. 114 Such studies allow screening for a number of diseases or
traits all at one time, not limited to determining whether a single gene
is associated with a particular disease.115
Genome-wide association studies have provided researchers with a
powerful tool to search for the genetic influences responsible for complex
diseases116 and genetic bases for drug reactions.117 Such diseases are
distinct from single-gene diseases because the causal factors are often
much more complicated—the causes can be linked to a combination of
both environmental and genetic factors.118 Genome-wide association
studies have revolutionized the way scientists research the causes of
disease and have opened up enormous potential for finding genetic causal
factors that once remained completely mysterious.119 Due to the increasing
China, and the United States in order to analyze associations between genetic variants
and disease. Id. The HapMap Project was conceived as a large, population-level method
of speeding discoveries in medical genetic research. The Int’l HapMap Consortium, A
Second Generation Human Haplotype Map of Over 3.1 Million SNPs, 449 NATURE 851,
851 (2007).
111. Guttmacher & Collins, supra note 94, at 1512.
112. W. Gregory Feero, Alan E. Guttmacher & Francis S. Collins, Genomic
Medicine—An Updated Primer, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2001, 2004 (2010).
113. See Guttmacher & Collins, supra note 94, at 1512; see also Katz & Schweitzer,
supra note 95, at 99 (distinguishing single-gene diseases as “monogenic” as opposed to
diseases caused by multiple genes as “polygenic”).
114. Feero et al., supra note 112, at 2004–05 (defining common terms in the glossary
such as SNPs, which are variations of a particular gene in a genetic sequence).
115. Manolio, supra note 88, at 173.
116. Id. at 166.
117. See Daly, supra note 91, at 435 (discussing how GWAS have uncovered certain
genetic associations for adverse drug reactions to the liver, skin, heart, and muscle).
118. Manolio, supra note 88, at 166.
119. See, e.g., Douglas F. Easton et al., Genome-Wide Association Study Identifies
Novel Breast Cancer Susceptibility Loci, 447 NATURE 1087, 1087 (2007) (describing a
genome-wide association study to identify four possible causative genes that may be in
part responsible for breast cancer and hypothesizing that further alleles could be found
using a similar approach); Gilles Thomas et al., Multiple Loci Identified in a GenomeWide Association Study of Prostate Cancer, 40 NATURE GENETICS 310, 310 (2008)
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potential of GWAS, the past five years have yielded an explosion of
findings linking genetic variants to over eighty diseases, including various
cancers.120
B. Limitations of Genome-Wide Association Studies
Although GWAS have aided in advancing science and ultimately,
medical care, the general methodology behind such association studies
also has serious limitations that must be recognized in order to fully
determine what DTC genetic tests can and cannot tell consumers.
The first major limitation is the strength of the association between the
genetic variants and the investigated trait. The relative strength of the
association is often fairly weak.121 Many causal factors of the diseases
or conditions that GWAS investigate are complex; unlike single-gene
traits, the explanations for complex traits will likely involve multiple
genetic loci and, perhaps, environmental factors.122 Because there can
be such a multitude of associations, most of which may or may not be
known, the relevance of any one association may be relatively small or
moderate.123 The lifetime risk of the incidence of a disease in a population
often depends on many issues including genotype frequencies, differing
genetic variants across populations, and gene-gene and gene-environment
interactions.124

(describing methods using GWAS narrowing down four-out-of-nine suggestive loci
possibly linked to prostate cancer, which could be useful for risk prediction in certain
individuals); Psychiatric GWAS Consortium Coordinating Comm., Genomewide Association
Studies: History, Rationale, and Prospects for Psychiatric Disorders, 166 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
540, 546–48 (2009) (explaining that GWAS have been helpful and will be instrumental
in the future for finding genetic variants linked to psychiatric disorders such as autism,
bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia).
120. See Manolio, supra note 88, at 166. See generally Hindorff et al., supra note 45
(reporting creation of an online catalog of associations based on the results of published
GWAS); A Catalog of Published Genome-Wide Association Studies, NAT’L HUM.
GENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov/26525384 (last updated Mar. 3, 2012)
(cataloging published GWAS).
121. See Manolio, supra note 88, at 166; Feero et al., supra note 112, at 2003–05
(“Most SNPs associated with common diseases explain a small proportion of the
observed contribution of heredity to the risk of disease—in many cases less than 5 to
10%—substantially limiting the use of these markers to predict risk.”).
122. Manolio, supra note 88, at 167 (explaining that a genome-wide association
study led to discovering thirty variants associated with Crohn’s disease and over forty
variants to date for type 1 diabetes).
123. Yang et al., supra note 102, at 786.
124. Id.
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A second limitation is that researchers may obtain false-positive
associations that may lead researchers to incorrectly draw associations.125
Part of eliminating false-positive results is to look at results across
pooled, various GWAS.126 If a functional causal variant, which is actually
direct proof of causality as opposed to merely an association, cannot be
discerned, then the next-best alternative is to replicate the association
across multiple populations.127 An attractive, but false-positive, association
can be the result of improper methodology and can sometimes be
difficult to quickly catch.128 If such mistaken associations are difficult to
catch even by the well-trained eye, trusting that the public can discern
the strength of associations may prove to be too optimistic. Without
restructuring the way the industry is able to sell the scope of its service
and results, there will be too much room for error and misrepresentation.129
The third limitation in GWAS is that to bolster the strength of the
association between genetic variants and the investigated disease or trait,
such studies depend upon differences in population-dependent risk
factors. In assessing lifetime risk of developing the disease trait, differences
across populations and ethnicities can be important.130 As researchers
continue to generate data, most GWAS to date have been conducted
across white populations.131 This neglects potentially notable risk
differences in other races for particular disease incidence.132 Some traits,
such as diabetes, are more prone to differences across populations than
others.133 Accordingly, when evaluating lifetime risk, it is important to

125. See Manolio, supra note 88, at 167 (describing a multitiered approach to
narrowing down to a manageable and feasible amount the large number of SNPs tested
in a genome-wide association study as useful for minimizing false-positive results).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Paola Sebastiani et al., Genetic Signatures of Exceptional Longevity
in Humans, SCIENCE (July 1, 2010), http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/abstract/
science.1190532v2 (finding, through improper methods, inaccurate associations between
genetic variants and longevity, which prompted Science to issue a retraction); Tina
Hesman Saey, Critics Point to Flaws in Longevity Study, 178 SCI. NEWS 10 (2010),
available at http://www.sciencenews.org/view/generic/id/61050/title/Deleted_Scenes_
Critics_point_to_flaws_in_longevity_study (commenting on the Sebastiani error).
129. See infra Part VII.B.3.
130. One research group describes its study of breast cancer where it found “3-fold
differences . . . even within white populations.” Yang et al., supra note 102, at 791.
131. See id. at 791, 793.
132. Id. at 793.
133. Id. at 792.
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consider and properly convey the “appropriate population incidence
rates” to avoid misleading the receiver of genetic test results.134
Already, the lack of diverse population studies has affected the DTC
industry. Some consumers have requested and received refunds from
companies because they received sparse results—they were members of
ethnic groups not yet well studied.135 Without full and clear disclosure
before purchasing the kit and service, nonwhite consumers may be
misled into purchasing a service for which they will receive few results
or will receive results based on population studies not ideally applicable
to them.136 Noting that an individual does or does not have a genetic
variant associated with a trait may be innocent, but simplistically
assigning a risk level based on the presence or absence of a variant in the
absence of diverse population studies may mislead the unwary consumer
who has little background knowledge and who could be spending
hundreds of dollars on a test.137 Although addressing genetic results in
terms of racial classification might bring up the old fear of reinforcing—
or even reintroducing—a new kind of racial stereotyping, it not only is
one valid factor to consider but will inevitably lead to improved
understanding of what genetic test results ultimately reveal.138
The foregoing limitations illustrate that determining any individual’s
true risk of developing a disease may not always be so simple. Without
fully informing consumers about such limitations, the DTC industry

134. Id.
135. See DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 74 (statement of Gregory Kutz, Managing
Director, Forensic Audits and Special Investigation, Government Accountability Office)
(noting that two companies, deCODE and Pathway Genomics, had already given refunds
for minorities who had purchased tests).
136. See id. at 61–62 (statement of Gregory Kutz, Managing Director, Forensic
Audits and Special Investigation, Government Accountability Office).
137. See id. at 23 (statement of Rep. Donna M. Christensen, Member, H. Subcomm.
on Oversight & Investigations)
The gross underrepresentation of African Americans and other minorities in
clinical trials has impacted the kind of information we could receive from the
kind of genetic testing generally offered. It is my understanding that, because
of this, results may come back with no information on some of the diseases
that cause some of the major health disparities. And this is after the client has
paid for information that they don’t get.
Id.; see also Gniady, supra note 86, at 2444 (noting that tests can be hundreds, and even
thousands, of dollars).
138. See Bernstein, supra note 89, at 991 (noting that genetic information is distinct
from ordinary medical information because it “renders individuals as innately different,
thereby becoming a dangerous tool in the hands of those seeking to discriminate and
stigmatize”); David Wasserman, The Justifiability of Racial Classification and
Generalizations in Contemporary Clinical and Research Practice, 9 LAW, PROBABILITY
& RISK 215 (2010) (acknowledging the general fear of regressing to racial stereotyping
but discussing the relationship between the presence of genetic markers and racial
classification in terms of limitations and uses for risk assessment).
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risks misleading consumers about what test results really mean.139
Contrary to what some harsh critics say, the risk is not that the results of
genetic tests are meaningless or the work of the proverbial “snake oil
salesman”; to believe such accusations is to commit a grievous harm
upon future generations.140 The danger lies in selling the results to mean
something different from what they truly reveal, not that they are all
“snake oil.” These tests are meaningful in that they show curious
consumers small pieces of a larger puzzle in the genetic determination
of traits.141 It is still useful and interesting to know that one has a common
genetic variant associated with a disease—it simply is not a diagnosis
that one will exhibit that related complex trait.142

139. See Feero et al., supra note 112, at 2009 (noting, for instance, that because in
every twenty tests ordered there may be a false-positive result, it will be a challenge to
“separat[e] the wheat from the chaff”).
140. Some members of Congress had a very visceral reaction to the existence of
DTC genetic testing companies. The following comments illuminate the need for better
understanding amongst all interested parties. See DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 51
(statement of Rep. Parker Griffith, Member, H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations).
I don’t think that the companies that are in question here would, if they
disappeared tomorrow, would impact the scientific community and our desire
to do research into genetics. . . . I don’t think that is really a discussion here. . . .
This is all bogus. This is nothing more than the snake oil salesman revisited
again in a high-tech community and in a high-tech way.
Id. However, such fears are not new—Skloot describes how the reputation of an
immortal cell line, a rare discovery, had an uphill battle with the public because the
image of cell culturing in the early twentieth century was already marred from the
publicity missteps made by imprudent scientists and media. See SKLOOT, supra note 6,
at 61–62. Skloot writes, “Tissue culture was the stuff of racism, creepy science fiction,
Nazis, and snake oil. It wasn’t something to be celebrated. In fact, no one paid much
attention to it at all.” Id. at 62. It was considered “snake oil,” but today, we owe the
polio vaccine, advances in chemotherapy, cloning, gene-mapping, and in vitro fertilization to
that same technology. Id. at 2. History, pocked with scars of fear and hubris, instructs
us to choose our words wisely.
141. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 77, at 2 (agreeing that the presence
of genetic variants is only one piece of the puzzle and stating that family background,
medical history, and environment should not be discounted).
142. Manolio, supra note 88, at 166 (explaining that associations for complex traits
may have limited effect on incidence of disease and few may be absolutely necessary to
determine incidence of disease); see also MAX BLACK, “The Identity of Indiscernibles,”
in METAPHYSICS: CONTEMPORARY READINGS 104–13 (Michael J. Loux ed., 2001). Black
describes the problem of whether or not two things with qualitatively-the-same features
share identity. Id. Speaking analogously, here, possession of a variant is not the same as
trait expression, but the misunderstanding seems to be that they are the same. The key is
in removing oneself from the misapplication of Black’s paradox.
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C. Definitional Issues Facing Future Legislation
The passage of GINA was one small step toward developing a body of
genetics law, but without more guidance, even its scope of definitions is
too narrow to account for the problems that the public and the industry
face.143 For instance, Congress defined genetic test as merely “analysis
of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites, that detects
genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes.”144 This definition lacks
the specificity necessary to apply it to the DTC genetic testing industry.145
The most troubling word in this definition is analysis. Many activities
could be called “analysis” by different objective observers. Actually
observing the biological material could qualify as analysis, but so could
inspecting the data and deriving conclusions from it. The definition, as
it stands, may preclude differentiation between in-depth analysis of
someone’s risk for disease as opposed to more innocent uses such as
ancestry analysis. The difference has to do with a wide spectrum of
activity: everything from deriving sophisticated conclusions bordering on
medical diagnoses to simple observation that one has a genetic marker at
all.
The definition for genetic services under this chapter is just as unhelpful.
It defines genetic service as one of three things: “(A) a genetic test;
(B) genetic counseling (including obtaining, interpreting, or assessing
genetic information); or (C) genetic education.”146 Here, it seems that if
all interpretation falls under the umbrella of genetic counseling, then
what the DTC companies engage in is just that, genetic counseling. But
it must be remembered that these definitions were drafted for GINA’s
employment discrimination chapter, and as of yet, neither GINA nor any
other existing statute has a section specifically addressing the DTC
industry’s activities. Thus, whether Congress really would conclude that
the general definition of genetic test would include all analyses, even of
ancestry or simple traits, and whether such activities could be called
143. See Payne, supra note 44, at 36 (noting that in coming up with definitions for
GINA, it became clear that defining such terms as genetic condition and genetic
information was quite difficult). Likely, coming up with precise definitions for the
purposes of the DTC genetic testing industry will require splitting hairs as well.
144. 42 U.S.C § 2000ff(7) (Supp. IV 2010).
145. The definition is quite general and broad, so it lacks the specificity to account
for the various types of genetic test results the industry generates. See The Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act: Hearing on H.R. 493 Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 110th Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of
Rep. Nathan Deal, Member, H. Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce). Representative Deal expressed serious concern that the definition for genetic
test was much too broad in that it may include routine tests not contemplated by
the legislation. Id.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(7).
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“genetic counseling,” is still open to interpretation. It seems as though
Congress would be not especially concerned about ancestry but very
concerned about risk prediction.147 This highlights the need for Congress
to continue the legislation it began in GINA.
Congress should reconsider the definitions utilized within the scope of
the DTC genetic testing industry.148 If Congress were to draft a new chapter
of GINA-like legislation, it must start from the very beginning and draft
new definitions that will clearly address the complex activities of this
industry.149 Otherwise, Congress will be fitting the DTC industry in a
Procrustean bed, running the risk of quashing this fledgling industry
through too stringent and ill-fitting legislation.150
One way to formulate a definition of a genetic test would be to
specifically include within the legislative definition any higher level
analysis that would include risk prediction or drug-reaction prediction.151
Another possibility would be to categorize and define all risk-predictive
tests as necessarily “medical,” thereby immediately giving the FDA
direct purview over these tests.152 The former option is preferable
because it addresses the specific differences of the varied activities that

147. See Arthur L. Beaudet, Which Way for Genetic Test Regulation? Leave Test
Interpretation to Specialists, 466 NATURE 816, 817 (2010). This is because the risk
involved in allowing activities such as ancestry services based on genetic tests is relatively
low—people are unlikely to make severely life-changing decisions based on
such information.
148. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff (Supp. IV 2010) (listing definitions in the
context of genetic information and employment discrimination).
149. See David Castle, Genomic Nutritional Profiling: Innovation and Regulation
in Nutrigenomics, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 37, 38 (2008), for a reason to resist the
temptation to apply old law to new technologies. Castle discusses the regulatory issues
of nutrigenomics, which is an offshoot of the genetic testing technology at issue in this
Comment. Id. Castle worries that “in light of the evolution of the science and
commercial developments, regulators must cope with the problem of fitting existing
regulations and regulatory practices to nutrigenomics even though these regulations
existed prior to the advent of this field.” Id. at 39. This worry, which is pertinent to the
umbrella issue of DTC genetic testing regulation, is one main reason why the solution
must encompass a holistic approach, not a single regulatory scheme. See infra Part VIII.
Because technology in this area changes so quickly, lawmakers need a novel modus
operandi, not an ad hoc regulation of the particular technology in question. Id.
150. See Gail Javitt, Which Way for Genetic Test Regulation? Assign Regulation
Appropriate to the Level of Risk, 466 NATURE 817, 818 (2010) (“In such a fast-changing
landscape, striking the right balance between protecting the public and promoting
innovation is crucial.”).
151. McGuire et al., supra note 69, at 182 (calling this approach risk-stratification).
152. James P. Evans & Robert C. Green, Direct to Consumer Genetic Testing:
Avoiding a Culture War, 11 GENETICS MED. 568, 569 (2009).

307

the DTC industry engages in. It would help to conceptually differentiate
the activities and direct the appropriate amount of oversight to each
activity. The latter option is a one-size-fits-all approach that may not
adequately address the idea that risk-predictive tests can be presented
upon a wide spectrum—as merely educational or as equivalent to medical
diagnoses.153
VI. MEDICAL DEVICE OR EDUCATION AND INFORMATION:
HAVING YOUR CAKE AND EATING IT TOO
A. The Purpose of Genetic Tests and Regulatory Scope
One of the issues surrounding how the industry should be regulated is
determining whether the purpose of genetic tests is medical or purely
educational and informational.154 Most of the DTC companies post
disclaimers stating that they do not purport to give medical advice.155 In
the past, these companies have adamantly maintained that what they
offer is a service not intended for diagnosis or treatment and that this
precludes classification as a medical device.156 However, these companies
are communicating mixed signals to consumers. One company tells
consumers to “take charge of your health and wellness today”157 while
another company tells consumers they can “learn if certain medications
work with your genetic makeup”158 and that results “can help point you
toward better health and well-being.”159 Based on these companies’ own
claims, the FDA had determined that these tests qualify as medical
devices under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).160

153. See Lobel, supra note 107, at 379–80 (describing a one-size-fits-all approach
as a negative feature of a traditional form of governing).
154. DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 131–32 (statements of Rep. Bart Stupak,
Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations, and Ashley Gould, General
Counsel, 23andMe).
155. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, DECODEME, http://www.decodeme.com/
faq#interpreting3 (last visited Mar. 6, 2012) (“[I]t is not a medical test, and it is by no
means a substitute for professional medical advice, genetic counseling, diagnosis, or
treatment.”).
156. DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 77 (statement of Dr. James Evans, Editor-in-Chief,
Genetics in Medicine).
157. Dan Vorhaus, Closer Scrutiny Ahead for DTC Genetic Testing Claims, GENOMICS
L. R EP . (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2011/03/
24/closer-scrutiny-ahead-for-dtc-claims/ (quoting message from 23andMe’s website to
consumers).
158. NAVIGENICS, http://www.navigenics.com/visitor/genetics_and_health/ (last visited
Mar. 6, 2012).
159. Id.
160. DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 14 (statement of Rep. Bart Stupak, Chairman,
H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations).
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B. FDA Definition of a Medical Device and the Need for
Line-Drawing
The FDCA, in relevant part, defines medical device as follows:
[A]n instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro
reagent, or other similar or related article, including any component, part, or
accessory, which is . . . intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other
conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man
or other animals, . . . or intended to affect the structure or any function of the
body of man or other animals . . . .161

It is possible for DTC companies to avoid being classified as medical
and continue marketing their products as purely educational, and this
would not be entirely undesirable—after all, access to such information
can improve the general scientific education of lay people.162 However,
if industry members chose to do this, they would need to rethink risk
prediction and drug-response prediction activities or be subject to FDA
oversight for these particular activities.163 As one company maintains, it
is possible that the sole purpose of these tests could be for educational
and informational purposes.164 If that is the case, however, then no
claims about changing a consumer’s health habits or choices should be
made; otherwise these tests appear to fall squarely within the purview of
the FDA definition.165 Instead of reducing an individual’s genomic data
for any given variant down to muddy classifications such as higher, average,
and decreased risk, these companies should simply state that any given
variant has been associated with a phenotypic trait, or condition, based

161. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2006) (emphasis added).
162. Contra Tamir, supra note 4, at 219 (stating that despite the possible
educational benefit to the public, DTC genetic tests should not be offered to an illprepared and genetically illiterate public). One wonders if the genetic illiteracy of the
general public is overstated given both the self-selecting group of consumers who seek
out DTC tests and their desire to learn and understand the meaning of the tests.
163. See Solberg, supra 24, at 718–19. The FDA has asserted before that it is
within its statutory right to regulate DTC genetic tests, but it had declined to try to do so
until the summer of 2010. Id.
164. DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 95 (statement of Ashley Gould, General
Counsel, 23andMe); see Carlson, supra note 16, at 39. Carlson warns that it is “both
shallow and short sighted” to merely deem the DTC genetic testing technology as a
“leviathan of biotechnology.” Id. It seems like a tautology to say that the DTC genetic
testing technology can be used to teach the public about genetic testing technology, but
because it is so poorly understood, this is a necessary reality if lawmakers and the public
desire meaningful progress. See id.
165. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h).
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on the current state of science.166 It is key to distinguish the foregoing
risk and prediction results from other kinds of results these companies
present, such as those having to do with ancestry, which can clearly be
for educational purposes and remain relatively uncontroversial.167 From
the DTC companies’ perspective, avoiding being classified as medical is
imperative if they want to keep touting the educational benefits of their
services.168 From the consumers’ perspective, avoiding these classifications
preserves consumers’ ability to learn about their own biological information
in the context of current science. This is an educational benefit, perhaps
even a right, worth protecting.169
Despite the optimistic message most of the DTC industry sends to
consumers regarding the usefulness of its tests for improving their
health, the scope of what these tests reveal should be more accurately
conveyed. Although it is clear that advances in genomics will offer
medical professionals new clinical tools via genetic test results, the industry
is still in the “Stone Age of genomic medicine.”170 Accordingly, most
test results are of little to no clinical use currently.171 Even with high
hopes for the field of personalized medicine of tomorrow, it may still be

166. See Guttmacher et al., supra note 112, at 1518. The authors discuss how a
person who has certain mutational variants, such as MODY 1, MODY 2, or MODY 3,
which increase risk for diabetes, has a high likelihood of disease. Id. However, they also
characterize the relationship between variant and disease as an association, an association that
when viewed on a population-scale level, may have a one-in-one-thousand prevalence of
actually manifesting. Id.
167. See Marietta & McGuire, supra note 96, at 369–70 (noting how it seems clear
that ancestry and simple-trait analysis, such as for bitter taste perception, are not medical).
168. See infra Part VIII.D.
169. Id. Indeed, many customers of DTC companies seem to be satisfied with the
type of services they receive, which may indicate that many consumers do not expect
medical services. Keyan Salari, The Dawning Era of Personalized Medicine Exposes a
Gap in Medical Education, 6 PLOS MED. 1, 1 (Aug. 25, 2009), http://www.plosmedicine.
org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1000138. This indicates that despite
the naysayers, educational benefit is perceived by consumers as an actual benefit worthy
of protection. In order to protect this benefit, the DTC industry needs to steer clear of
any possibility of supplanting traditional medical care. Reframing the way the industry
communicates with consumers is a key way to do this. See supra notes 154–59 and
accompanying text.
170. Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of a New Evidentiary Paradigm: The Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act Enters the Genomic Era, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 461–62
(2010).
171. Manolio, supra note 88, at 173; see Gniady, supra note 86, at 2431 (“In most
scenarios, the results are even less useful than having a cholesterol-level reading taken,
where there are a variety of options for treatment of dangerously high cholesterol levels,
such as exercise, diet changes, prescription medicine, or even surgical intervention when
necessary.”).
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apt to say genomic information is an end in itself rather than a means to
better healthcare.172
VII. THE PROPER INTERPRETERS AND BEARING THE
RISK OF LIABILITY
A. Insufficient Genetics Expertise Amongst Today’s Physicians
Despite the interpretation issues with DTC tests and the lack of clarity
regarding whether they are or should be labeled medical devices, critics
have called for the necessary inclusion of a physician for interpretation
of genetic test results.173 It is not clear, however, that currently limiting
the gatekeepers of this information to physicians or other healthcare
professionals would serve a beneficial purpose.174 Although likely to
change, the majority of the medical profession is currently ill-equipped
to accurately interpret genomic sequencing results.175 As more and more
patients begin bringing in their test results from DTC companies, several
studies have highlighted the limitations posed by insufficient knowledge
of this developing field.176 In one survey conducted on nearly 6000
people, 64% of respondents reported receiving no educational material

172. See Tamir, supra note 4, at 214 (noting that some additional limitations
keeping DTC tests from being of more clinical utility is the fact that many markers are
yet undiscovered, their contributions to disease and interactions yet unknown). But see
Evans, supra note 170, at 461 (stating that knowing genomic information “as an endpoint”
purely for its own sake is a thing of the past (quoting Wylie Burke, Integrating Genetic
Technology into a Health Care System, in DIFFUSION AND USE OF GENOMIC INNOVATIONS
IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 33, 33 (Lyla M. Hernandez rapporteur,
Nat’l Academies Press 2008))).
173. See, e.g., Marietta & McGuire, supra note 96, at 372 (calling for the inclusion
of licensed healthcare providers).
174. Compare DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 65 (statement by Jeffrey Shuren,
Director, Center for Devices and Radiological Health at the Food and Drug Administration)
(agreeing that consumers would be better off if a physician or equivalent medical
professional were involved in the process), with Salari, supra note 169, at 1 (“While
some physicians are equipped to interpret such reports, evidence indicates that the
majority of physicians are poorly prepared to deal with issues related to genetics and
genomics, and that such patients are likely to be disappointed and misinformed.”).
175. Salari, supra note 169, at 1; see Gniady, supra note 86, at 2443. In the 1990s,
there was great concern over the inability of physicians to analyze earlier versions of
genetic tests and a substituted reliance on commercial laboratories to interpret them. Id.
With the increase in the genetic testing industry, this concern comes up once again in the
context of more complex technology. Id.
176. Salari, supra note 169, at 1.
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on genetics from the healthcare provider they relied on most.177 In
another study, one third of physicians failed to correctly interpret the
results of single-gene tests conducted for colorectal cancer.178 Given
that a single-gene test is an older technology than the GWAS, which are
more advanced cutting-edge tools, and that over 30% of physicians still
have trouble even with single-gene tests, the prospect of handing over
the mantle of responsibility solely to this group is troubling.179 Another
study showed that over half of physicians surveyed answered basic genetic
testing questions incorrectly even after a genetic testing company sent
out educational mailers.180 Despite this educational gap present across
physicians, it is important to note that 68% of physicians surveyed
expressed a desire to become better versed in the interpretation of genetic
testing.181 Regardless, these surveys show that limiting interpretation to
physicians is not the answer and, in fact, oversimplifies the problem.182
The assumption that only physicians are equipped in terms of both
knowledge and ability to interpret and communicate these results may
lead to the same dangers of misinformation, misrepresentation, and even
fraud, which the industry is struggling to ward off.183
This lack of qualified professionals in the medical field to offer
medical advice based on such test results is compounded by the fact that
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See Tamir, supra note 4, at 220 (“[R]egrettably, healthcare professionals
themselves often lack familiarity with the basic principles of genetics, thereby hindering
the application of genomic advances into routine patient care.”); see also Rucinski, supra
note 13, at 822. The lack of medical know-how regarding genetic tests is troubling
considering “[d]octors have both ‘ethical and legal obligations to stay abreast of the latest
research in their fields.’” Id. (quoting Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the
Haphazard Diffusion in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 404 (2002)).
180. Salari, supra note 169, at 1.
181. Id.
182. Genetics-savvy physicians are not the only professionals in short supply—so
too are other genetics professionals who could help communicate what results mean to
consumers seeking more pointed medical advice. Id. at 2 (noting only 3300 genetics
professionals are licensed in the United States by the American Board of Medical
Genetics or the American Board of Genetic Counseling); see also Tamir, supra note 4, at
220 (“[T]here is a perceptible lack of physicians and genetic [counselors] trained in the
field of genetics.”). Furthermore, although the GAO argues these tests may not be of any
substantial benefit to the consumer, note that even the GAO acknowledged the comments
made by the SACGHS regarding the current state of the medical field: “[Practitioners]
cannot keep up with the pace of development of genetic tests. . . . [and] are not adequately
prepared to use test information to treat patients appropriately . . . .” SACGHS REPORT, supra
note 11, at 72, 187; GAO REPORT, supra note 31, at 16 tbl.2.
183. See DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 22–23 (statement of Rep. Donna M.
Christensen, Member, H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations). While admitting
bias because, as a physician, Christensen has always disliked DTC advertising, she expressed
that a healthcare professional is needed for analysis and guidance in order to ward off
“wrong assumptions and wrong decisions.” Id.
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several DTC companies explicitly claim that they are not providing
medical advice and instead suggest taking the results to a physician for
advice.184 This places a heavy burden on the medical profession. It
potentially shifts the burden of liability for faulty interpretation from the
companies to doctors, who may be ill-equipped to interpret the results.185
B. Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Standard of
Care in a Novel Arena
1. A Parallel Problem
Although the medical profession is currently ill-equipped to consistently
and reliably interpret DTC genetic tests for its patients, critics of the
DTC genetic testing industry are calling for the profession’s involvement.186
However, the consequences of this could be catastrophic. Under the
“learned intermediary doctrine,” involvement of doctors in this way may

184. See, e.g., Terms of Service, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/tos/ (last
visited Mar. 6, 2012); Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 155; Terms and Conditions,
NAVIGENICS, http://www.navigenics.com/visitor/what_we_offer/our_policies/terms_conditions/
(last visited Mar. 6, 2012).
185. See Rucinski, supra note 13, at 797–98. This kind of burden shifting would
impact the degree of liability exposure a doctor would face, especially as to the scope of
duty imposed on doctors to sufficiently inform their patients as to medical decisions. See
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CACI (2012) [hereinafter CACI],
available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/caci_2012_edtion.pdf (giving
jury instructions for litigation in California medical malpractice cases). CACI lays out
the jury instruction for standard of care of health professionals in California as follows:
[A/An] [insert type of medical practitioner] is negligent if [he/she] fails to
use the level of skill, knowledge, and care in diagnosis and treatment that other
reasonably careful [insert type of medical practitioners] would use in the same
or similar circumstances. This level of skill, knowledge, and care is sometimes
referred to as “the standard of care.”
[You must determine the level of skill, knowledge, and care that other
reasonably careful [insert type of medical practitioners] would use in the same
or similar circumstances . . . .]
Id. § 501, at 408 (alterations in original) (giving the jury instruction for “standard of care
for health care professionals”); see also id. § 502, at 411 (giving the jury instruction for
medical specialists). The standard of care in California gives deference to what another
medical practitioner would have done in a similar situation. This does allow doctors
some leeway. However, given that commercial genetic testing is so new, it would be
difficult to determine what is and is not appropriate for doctors to do when a patient
brings an outside test to them. If they choose to interpret the test, interpret it incorrectly,
and it is shown in court that the doctor’s “skill, knowledge, and care” in handling this
situation was not on a par with that of others in a similar situation, this may mean trouble.
186. See generally Marietta & McGuire, supra note 96.
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serve to shield the DTC companies from liability and shift it to
physicians.187
Traditionally, the learned intermediary doctrine shifts the burden of
informing patients about the risks of prescription drugs from pharmaceutical
companies to physicians.188 Under this doctrine, physicians are held liable
for informing patients about potential adverse effects of drugs because
physicians are in a position to determine whether a drug or treatment will
be right for an individual patient.189 Pharmaceutical drug and medical
device manufacturers, in contrast, satisfy their duty to patients by properly
warning prescribing physicians.190
In a suit based on DTC genetic tests, this learned intermediary defense
could be applicable,191 potentially implicating any number of players as
187. This assumes, or course, that the status of the DTC genetic tests could be
covered under the learned intermediary doctrine. Normally, courts have declined to
extend the learned intermediary doctrine to drugs or medical devices available to the
public without a prescription. D RUG AND M EDICAL D EVICE L IABILITY D ESKBOOK
§ 2.03[3] (2006). This stems both from the idea that the manufacturer has an actual and
intended direct manufacturer-consumer relationship and from the lack of a physician’s
involvement. Id. (citing Torsiello v. Whithall Labs., Div. of Home Prods. Corp., 398
A.2d 132, 138 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979)). In the DTC genetic test situation,
however, if physicians are to play a greater role as the FDA and Congress would prefer,
then the requirement to adequately warn physicians and to impute liability to those
physicians may be appropriate.
188. Robertson, supra note 58, at 232.
189. Id. (“Prescription drugs are likely to be complex medicines, esoteric in formula
and varied in effect. As a medical expert, the prescribing physician can take into account
the propensities of the drug, as well as the susceptibilities of his patient. . . . The choice
he makes is an informed one. . . . Pharmaceutical companies then, who must warn
ultimate purchasers of dangers inherent in patent drugs sold over the counter, in selling
prescription drugs are required to warn only the prescribing physician, who acts as a
‘learned intermediary’ between manufacturer and consumer.” (quoting Reyes v. Wyeth
Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974))).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 233. The Restatement sets out the learned intermediary doctrine as follows:
(a) A manufacturer of a prescription drug or medical device who sells or
otherwise distributes a defective drug or medical device is subject to
liability for harm to persons caused by the defect. A prescription drug or
medical device is one that may be legally sold or otherwise distributed only
pursuant to a health-care provider’s prescription.
(b) For purposes of liability under Subsection (a), a prescription drug or
medical device is defective if at the time of sale or other distribution the
drug or medical device:
(1) contains a manufacturing defect as defined in § 2(a); or
(2) is not reasonably safe due to defective design as defined in Subsection
(c); or
(3) is not reasonably safe due to inadequate instructions or warnings as
defined in Subsection (d).
(c) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to
defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or medical
device are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits
that reasonable health-care providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks

314

[VOL. 49: 279, 2012]

Age of an Information Revolution
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

the learned intermediary.192 This learned intermediary could be the
consulted doctor or the DTC company providing the information, or
perhaps even the consumer could be considered the sole learned
interpreter.193
2. Genetic Tests: A Service or Product
To begin a discussion of the learned intermediary doctrine194 as applied to
DTC genetic testing, one preliminary question to address is whether
DTC tests are services or products. The categorization of these tests
impacts the degree of liability that involved parties may face.195 The
DTC genetic testing industry characterizes itself as a service, and not as
a products manufacturer.196 If it were characterized as a product
manufacturer, it would be subject to strict products liability for any faulty
and therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the drug or medical device for
any class of patients.
(d) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to
inadequate instructions or warnings if reasonable instructions or warnings
regarding foreseeable risks of harm are not provided to:
(1) prescribing and other health-care providers who are in a position to
reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or
warnings; or
(2) the patient when the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that
health-care providers will not be in a position to reduce the risks of
harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings.
(e) A retail seller or other distributor of a prescription drug or medical device
is subject to liability for harm caused by the drug or device if:
(1) at the time of sale or other distribution the drug or medical device
contains a manufacturing defect as defined in § 2(a); or
(2) at or before the time of sale or other distribution of the drug or medical
device the retail seller or other distributor fails to exercise reasonable
care and such failure causes harm to persons.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 (1998).
192. See Randy J. Prebula, Note, The Promise of Personalized Medicine: Regulatory
Controls and Tort Influences in the Context of Personalized Risks and Benefits,
26 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 343, 368 (2010).
193. Id.
194. For a general discussion on the learned intermediary doctrine, see infra Part
VII.B.
195. See, e.g., Prebula, supra note 192, at 370 (“Because clinical laboratories have
historically been viewed by FDA and CMS as service providers, any basis for liability on
the part of the laboratory would likely need to be established, for example, by negligence
in the reasonable provision of medical services.”).
196. DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 81 (statement of Ashley Gould, General Counsel,
23andMe); contra Patsner, supra note 53, at 238–39 (discussing DTC genetic tests as
medical products).
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products.197 Thus, the manufacturer of a test that yields faulty results,
which in turn could cause a doctor to misdiagnose a patient, would be
subject to strict products liability.198 However, if DTC genetic testing
companies are viewed only as service providers, simply offering to
conduct a test and provide results would not yield strict liability, and
instead, some negligence of a duty of reasonable care would need to be
shown.199
Even viewing the genetic tests as products, rather than services, another
consequence of the DTC marketing is that it may weaken the availability
of the learned intermediary defense for manufacturers because it prevents
physicians from readily standing between consumers and manufacturers.200
If physicians are expected to be involved, however, this is more problematic
than easily imputing a doctor as the undisputed learned intermediary.201
Much more than in previous generations, consumers now have ample
access to medical and scientific information due to the advent of the
Internet, so that consumers can be viewed as better informed.202 If the
product itself is questionable, however, in many cases even an informed
consumer would depend on a physician or someone with more expertise
to assess the risks and benefits of a medical course of action, and in turn
this intermediary would bear the risk of liability for unreasonable uses of
the tests.203
3. Direct-to-Consumer Advertising and Interpretation
A readily available industry watchdog—whether it is the FDA, the
FTC, or physicians—is needed to protect against consumer fraud. This
197. Prebula, supra note 192, at 370. Subjecting DTC providers to strict products
liability would mean that the manufacturer would be liable without any finding of fault.
See id.
198. Id.
199. See id. (“This could be demonstrated by evidence that the laboratory mishandled or
misidentified specimens in a way that could lead to inaccurate test results being reported
to doctors and patients.”).
200. See id. at 368. It is the actual and intended direct relationship, without a
physician’s involvement, that has traditionally excluded the learned intermediary defense
for manufacturers in nonprescription situations after all. See supra note 187 and
accompanying text.
201. See id.
202. Rucinski, supra note 13, at 797. Contra Marietta & McGuire, supra note 96,
at 373 (noting that although “[c]onsumers should be free to purchase information,” it is
likely that consumers will misinterpret information given to them).
203. Prebula, supra note 192, at 368. The rise of the Internet has also facilitated
online communities where consumers can share and compare personal genomic data with
others. See Sandra Soo-Jin Lee, Social Networking in the Age of Personal Genomics, 3 ST.
LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 41, 48 (2009). 23andMe, for instance, allows members
to post comments, share stories, and get in touch with relatives to discuss and compare
genetic findings. See 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2012).
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is especially true because of the prevalence of DTC advertising that
targets the consumer directly with the goal of enticing business.204 When
consumers see a business’s claims and advertisements, they receive only
filtered information.205 The FTC has authority to guard against this type
of false and misleading advertising.206 It has yet to institute any
enforcement actions against DTC companies, however, only issuing a
consumer warning pamphlet in 2006.207 According to the FTC, a false
advertisement is misleading in a material respect “[if] it either inaccurately
represents the product or fails to disclose material facts.”208 The FTC
also states that if a claim relates to public health or safety, such a claim
is presumptively material.209 Even with such a presumption, and with
monetary, health, and safety damages in the balance, the FTC has yet to
apply this presumption to DTC genetic tests.210 As a result, although some
companies have taken the initiative to educate their customers,211 DTC

204. Gniady, supra note 86, at 2444. Most objections focus on heavy marketing
campaigns targeted at drawing in business without regard to the efficacy or necessity of
marketed genetic tests. Id.
205. See id. at 2443–44 (explaining that DTC advertising for genetic tests is very
similar to the DTC advertising drug companies employ by transmitting their messages by
newspaper, magazine, and television); see also Blumer v. Acu-Gen Biolabs, Inc., 638
F. Supp. 2d 81 (D. Mass. 2009) (discussing the Baby Gender Mentor class action based
on false advertising of prenatal genetic tests). In Blumer, Acu-Gen Biolabs marketed the
Baby Gender Mentor Kit as a test to discern the gender of a fetus by detecting genderspecific fetal blood in the mother’s blood. Id. at 84. It was falsely advertised as “99.9%
accurate” and “infallibly accurate in foretelling the gender of a healthy baby.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). When confronted by the consumers about inaccurate
results, the CEO of the company gave a variety of disconcerting reasons for the
inaccuracies including fetus chromosomal abnormalities, vanishing twin syndrome, and
infant deformities. Id. The women feared they had gotten unnecessary and dangerous
procedures, including multiple ultrasounds, amniocentesis, and chromosomal testing, as
a result of the testing and results. Id. Because many of the procedures were not covered
by insurance, the women shouldered the costs themselves. Id.
206. Gniady, supra note 86, at 2453.
207. Katherine Drabiak-Syed, Baby Gender Mentor: Class Action Litigation Calls
Attention to a Deficient Federal Regulatory Framework for DTC Genetic Tests,
Politicized State Statutory Construction, and a Lack of Informed Consent, 14 MICH. ST.
U. J. MED. & L. 71, 77 (2010) (citing FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 77).
208. Id. at 76 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1) (2006)).
209. Id. at 84.
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., Health Reports: Complete List, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.
com/health/all/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2012) (describing in detail scientific information
about diseases and including citations); For Scientists: White Papers, supra note 86
(describing 23andMe’s methodology for arriving at results).
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genetic testing companies are not required to disclose the scientific bases
of their tests.212
The nature of DTC advertising affects the learned intermediary doctrine
and the degree to which the defense should be available to DTC
companies. Courts may be less willing to allow DTC companies the
advantage of a learned intermediary defense because these companies
directly market to and manage test results for the consumer without
requiring any intermediary.213 Furthermore, because of the demonstrated
deficit in genetics expertise of the medical profession, it is likely inadequate
to depend solely on traditional intermediaries, such as physicians, to
clear up advertising confusion.214 These companies possess the best
knowledge about their own tests, methods, and results, so it would be fair
for liability to be imputed back to them—as opposed to consulted
doctors—unless they reframe their advertising and results.215 In fact, over
the years, the growth of DTC advertising has weakened the learned
intermediary defense, and courts have supported shifting the burden
back to manufacturers. 216
Although a governmental entity is not the traditional archetype of a
learned intermediary, one can think of a governmental entity, such as the
FTC, as a potential type of watchdog proxy for a traditional intermediary
in order to force companies to stay honest. Because genetic tests are
highly technical, consumers would benefit from a governmental entity,
which has the means to assemble experts and promulgate uniform
guidelines to ensure the accuracy of advertising claims and prevent
puffery.217 In other industries, such as the dietary supplement industry,
the FTC requires disclaimers stating that the supplement is not FDA212. Drabiak-Syed, supra note 207, at 84.
213. See Gniady, supra note 86, at 2444 (noting that in light of recent successful
attempts to deregulate drug advertisements and in light of recent free speech trends, objections
to DTC advertising would likely be unavailing). Furthermore, even if physicians were
involved and the manufacturer adequately warned the physician about the product,
aggressive promotion—“overpromotion”—could undercut the warnings, making the
manufacturer liable. Love v. Wolf, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (Ct. App. 1964); DRUG AND MEDICAL
DEVICE LIABILITY DESKBOOK, supra note 187, § 2.06.
214. See supra Part VII.A.
215. See Prebula, supra note 192, at 368 (discussing the policy rationale for
traditional application of the learned intermediary defense). But see Marietta & McGuire,
supra note 96, at 372–73, for an interesting discussion about company-employed physicians
and genetic counselors with regard to whether such a relationship triggers the traditional
doctor-patient relationship.
216. See Robertson, supra note 58, at 233 (citing Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734
A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999)). Perez held that because Wyeth engaged in a nationwide campaign
to directly market its drug to consumer women, not physicians, it had a duty to
sufficiently warn the women about potential side effects. Perez, 734 A.2d 1245.
217. See Gniady, supra note 86, at 2453–54 (discussing how the FTC does have
authority to regulate false and misleading advertising).

318

[VOL. 49: 279, 2012]

Age of an Information Revolution
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

approved and “not intended to diagnose, treat, cure, or prevent any
disease.”218 Perhaps one place to start improving advertising is to require
a similar disclaimer to be prominently displayed on DTC genetic testing
industry websites and advertisements. Some companies have disclaimers
posted on their website,219 but they are often buried in the fine print of
their terms-and-conditions page.220 If advertising is vague, however, it is
unclear “how learned any learned intermediary can be,” when labeling
by the manufacturer is insufficient, the disclaimer too difficult to find, or
the test too complex.221 The inherent complexity of the industry defies
traditional intermediaries and traditional solutions—this is why
governmental agencies are well positioned to craft uniform guidelines for
companies to follow from the very outset.
4. Applying the Learned Intermediary Doctrine and
Weighing Responsibility
The reason why governmental agencies need to step in becomes clear
with the following example that considers a scenario in which a DTC
genetic test customer engages a physician to play the role of a learned
intermediary in interpreting test results. A consumer brings in results of
a DTC genetic test to a private physician’s office. The consumer who
purchased a DTC test gets back the results showing higher risk of negative
response to a drug X, and then the concerned consumer takes this
information to the physician for further information. The physician
knows the patient has a heart condition and has been in the process of
coming up with a treatment regimen. Given current medical standards,
drug X is known to be one of the most effective drugs for the condition.
218. Id. at 2453 (quoting Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements
Concerning the Effect of the Product on the Structure or Function of the Body, 65 Fed.
Reg. 1001 (Jan. 6, 2000) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
219. See, e.g., Terms of Service, supra note 184 (“23andMe Services are for research,
informational, and educational use only. We do not provide medical advice. . . . 23andMe
does not recommend or endorse any specific course of action, resources, tests, physician
or other health care providers, drugs, biologics, medical devices or other products,
procedures, opinions, or other information that may be mentioned on our website.”).
220. See, e.g., DeCODEme Genetic Scan Service Agreement and Informed Consent,
DECODEME, http://www.decodeme.com/service-agreement (last visited Mar. 6, 2012).
The problem with deCODE’s service agreement, and ones like it, is that one must read
through long, dense disclaimers searching for the most important ones of benefit to the
consumer. See id.
221. Prebula, supra note 192, at 368.
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The doctor must decide whether to prescribe or not to prescribe the drug.222
The physician, who lacks expertise in interpreting genetic results and
who is unfamiliar with DTC company methods for interpreting risk, is
thus forced to make a choice that could result in litigation for improper
treatment no matter which choice the physician makes.223
The current state of the law gives scant concrete guidance in the above
specific scenario, but one court says of the medical professional standard
of negligence:
Each physician may with reason and fairness be expected to possess or have
reasonable access to such medical knowledge as is commonly possessed or
reasonably available to minimally competent physicians in the same specialty or
general field of practice throughout the United States, to have a realistic
understanding of the limitations on his or her knowledge or competence, and, in
general, to exercise minimally adequate medical judgment. . . .
In the care and treatment of each patient, each physician has a non-delegable
duty to render professional services consistent with that objectively ascertained
minimally acceptable level of competence he may be expected to apply given

222. Presented with this information from the DTC company, however, inaction or
action may lead to a lawsuit against the doctor. See Black et al., supra note 46, at 117–
18. The Judicial Council of California Jury Instructions, CACI, also sheds some light on
the problem, at least in California, through its jury instruction for “alternative methods of
care.” See CACI, supra note 185, § 506, at 442 (“[A/An] [insert type of medical
practitioner] is not necessarily negligent just because [he/she] chooses one medically
accepted method of treatment or diagnosis and it turns out that another medically accepted
method would have been a better choice.” (alterations in original)); Clemens v. Regents
of Univ. of Cal., 87 Cal. Rptr. 108, 116–17 (Ct. App. 1970). CACI § 506 is interesting
because it allows physicians the breathing room they need to make independent medical
decisions without fearing litigation anytime it turns out later that another medical route
would have ended up more favorable to the patient. See Barton v. Owen, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 494, 503–04 (Ct. App. 1977) (allowing for “professional judgment”). In other words, it
precludes “but for” reasoning. See Meier v. Ross Gen. Hosp., 445 P.2d 519, 530 (Cal.
1968). In the DTC context, it may be that interpreting the results and giving or not
giving the drug based on that information may have been better than ignoring them and
having the patient undergo a treatment regimen based on independent expertise. Or it
may not. The decision must simply have been a “medically accepted method of treatment or
diagnosis”—one out of potentially many. Yet how could a physician truly ignore a test
result if it indicates presence of markers strongly associated with serious conditions
simply because that physician may feel ill-equipped to deal with the results? See also
infra note 226 and accompanying text (discussing CACI § 508 regarding duty to refer to
a specialist).
223. See Marietta & McGuire, supra note 96, at 371 (noting that whether an activity
counts as the practice of medicine is usually a state matter that is defined in state
regulations and that the definitions usually include some combination of the following
words: diagnosis, treatment, cure, disease, disorder, and injury). One problem is that when a
physician must interpret the DTC company’s interpretations of results, the boundaries of
what counts as the practice of medicine are blurred. The second problem is that if it is
left up to the states to apply their own definitions, there will be little uniformity in regulating
an industry that ubiquitously reaches out to many states through the Internet.
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the qualifications and level of expertise he holds himself out as possessing and
given the circumstances of the particular case.224

In the hypothetical scenario above, it is unclear what should be expected
from physicians.225 If a patient goes to see a cardiologist, a gastroenterologist,
or even simply an internist, a patient could reasonably think the physician
should know something about genetic variants pertinent to his or her area
of practice. If so, then the patient may assume such a physician should
be able to interpret genetic tests giving results for those variants. It is
quite unclear what the scope of the doctor’s duty is to the patient in this
regard as well as what would constitute a breach.226 The threshold

224. Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So.2d 856, 871 (Miss. 1985) (discussing, in a case where a
sponge was left in a patient’s stomach, versions of the professional standard of care with
regard to medical malpractice); see also Hinlicky v. Dreyfuss, 848 N.E.2d 1285 (N.Y.
2006) (discussing the role reliance on medical practice guidelines plays in standard of
care). But see Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974) (moving away from a
view of liability based on custom in the medical community when it held that a physician
was negligent because “timely giving of [a] simple, harmless pressure test to th[e]
plaintiff . . . proximately resulted in the [plaintiff’s] blindness” even though the physician
followed the custom in the medical community in treating glaucoma patients). Compare
the Hall professional standard with the basic Restatement standard of the reasonable
person:
Negligent conduct may be either:
(a) an act which the actor as a reasonable man should recognize as involving
an unreasonable risk of causing an invasion of an interest of another, or
(b) a failure to do an act which is necessary for the protection or assistance of
another and which the actor is under a duty to do.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 284 (1965).
225. See, e.g., Patsner, supra note 53, at 260–63 (describing how the nature of the
DTC genetic testing industry’s shift to a commercial, purely nonmedical venture brings
up concerns about the qualifications of scientists employed at these companies as well as
general quality control of equipment and methods). Reasonableness is also the standard
that the FTC uses to determine whether a representation that a company makes is misleading;
it is whether a consumer’s reaction is a reasonable one. Drabiak-Syed, supra note 207,
at 76.
226. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 53, at 555 (citing Safer v. Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d
1188 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (holding that a physician had a duty “to warn of
the avertable risk from genetic causes, by definition a matter of familial concern” where
a daughter developed cancerous blockage and multiple polyptosis and the doctor, who
had treated her father for the same condition, did not tell her of the genetic risk)).
One option for the treating physician is to refer the patient to specialist qualified to
interpret the genetic test. See CACI, supra note 185, § 508, at 426. CACI § 508 lays out
the jury instruction for the duty to refer to a specialist as follows:
If a reasonably careful [insert type of medical practitioner] in the same
situation would have referred [name of patient] to a [insert type of medical
specialist], then [name of defendant] was negligent if [he/she] did not do so.
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question is whether the doctor in such a scenario should have known to
prescribe or not to prescribe drug X given the presence of the DTC results.
Or, if a drug is prescribed, there is a question of whether the physician
properly obtained informed consent from the patient.227 The ability to
obtain meaningful consent is dubious considering it is far from certain
that the average physician would have a meaningful understanding of the
tests.228 Clear guidelines are needed to delineate, for the present and
future, what each party’s responsibilities are in the interpretation and
communication of results.229
In general, doctors should be held responsible only to a limited extent
for failing to heed genetic tests brought in by patients where the patient
later develops a disease associated with a detected genetic variant.230
Where a doctor has not independently decided that a genetic test is
However, if [name of defendant] treated [name of patient] with as much skill
and care as a reasonable [insert type of medical specialist] would have, then
[name of defendant] was not negligent.
Id.; Simone v. Sabo, 231 P.2d 19, 25 (Cal. 1951). Thus, it may be that treating
physicians may simply fulfill their duty to the patient and avoid liability by referring the
patient to someone else. The trouble here is that because DTC tests are new there is little
legal guidance to tell us what the level of skill and care of a reasonable physician in this
scenario really would be.
227. See Rucinski, supra note 13, at 797–802 (discussing how informed consent
requires “capacity, disclosure, and voluntariness,” but that, today, what is considered the
“reasonable patient” regarding the degree of informed consent needed for medical
treatments must take into account the “informed consumer” because of increasing Internet
access to medical information and news before the patient ever steps into the doctor’s
office (quoting Douglas Andrew Grimm, Informed Consent for All! No Exceptions, 37
N.M. L. REV. 39, 40 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
228. See Salari, supra note 169, at 1.
229. See Prebula, supra note 192, at 371 (noting that courts have held physicians
liable for negligently prescribing drugs, even in cases having to do with insufficient
testing for prescribing the best drug for an individual patient). See also Kirsten Rabe
Smolensky, Creating Children with Disabilities: Parental Tort Liability for Liability for
Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 299 (2008), for a discussion on
parental tort liability for preimplantation genetic screenings and interventions. Although
it is outside the scope of this Comment, an interesting question is what rights and
responsibilities children of parents who bring genetic test results to private physicians
would have. See id. Although scholars have generally said that children born as a result
of preimplantation genetic intervention cannot sue their parents, id. at 299, it would be
interesting to know what liability the other players, companies, and physicians may have
in the future.
230. See Black et al., supra note 46, at 117. Black notes that under the current state
of the law, doctors could certainly face liability. Id.; see supra note 224 and accompanying
text. However, the current state of law does not clearly define the boundaries of such
liability. It is also interesting to consider Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash.
1974), in its move away from medical custom in imputing liability here, however.
Although interpreting genetic tests is not as easy as the “simple, harmless pressure test”
the court ruled the physician should have given in Helling, merely observing from
the test results that a person has a variant or not is simple. See id. Perhaps courts seeking to
evolve away from the custom standard would be more willing to impose liability to some
extent.
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necessary, subsequently ordered it, and had it analyzed by a qualified
employee at the medical facility, holding a doctor responsible for ignoring
an outside genetic test would be too strict.231 A physician should not be
forced to take on an expertise that was never claimed.232 This being
said, because the law does not define a physician’s scope of duty in the
context of DTC tests, it is quite likely that legal action could result from
action or inaction regarding these tests.233 A physician’s failure to act,
after all, can be just as harmful an action if a physician downplays potential
genetic risk.234
When a physician affirmatively does decide to undertake a particular
course of treatment based on outside genetic tests, this may yield a
different result in liability.235 In such a case, use of the test constitutes

231. Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So.2d 856, 871 (Miss. 1985) (discussing standard of care
and following customary practice in the medical community as a benchmark for liability); cf.
Rucinski, supra note 13, at 822 (noting that doctors have a duty to stay abreast of all new
medical developments in their field and that limiting the scope of informed consent as to
treatments ensures that patients are not misled by the wealth of information accessible to
the lay person).
232. This is, of course, assuming that such a physician does not claim expertise to
interpret results. If a physician does, it may open him or her up to liability. See Hall,
466 So.2d at 871 (imposing a standard of care that “may be expected to apply given the
qualifications and level of expertise [a physician] holds himself out as possessing and
given the circumstances of the particular case”).
Consider also the Restatement: it addresses the scope of the learned intermediary
doctrine in traditional scenarios only to deal with “drug[s] or medical device[s]” that are
prescribed by physicians. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 (1998).
Yet when a physician does not ignore test results but instead adopts them, one might ask
whether there is any real difference between prescribing a test and adopting test results if
the net outcome in each is that the doctor relies on these tests in making medical decisions.
When a physician adopts results in making medical decisions, there is an argument for
suggesting that physician should come to share in responsibility for consequences.
Nevertheless, when a physician ignores test results, the Restatement itself suggests support for
denying liability for physicians because they have not even prescribed the tests. See id.
233. Black et al., supra note 46, at 116–18.
234. Id. (“[P]laying down potential and unknown genetic risk in response to a
negative test, especially for patients with a strong family history of breast cancer, could
cause inattentiveness to other warning signs. Physicians could certainly be faced with
liability in these circumstances under current law.”).
235. See Rucinski, supra note 13, at 797–99 (discussing the scope of necessary
informed consent in the digital age). The doctrine of informed consent, for instance,
requires that doctors obtain informed consent from patients so that patients can make
educated decisions about their own medical treatment. Id. at 797–98. The Acuna v.
Turkish court brings up an analogously relevant point regarding the scope of informed
consent. There, the court said that although a doctor must provide “medically material”
information regarding abortion procedures, a physician is not required to discuss all the
possible available medical information. Id. at 798–99 (citing Acuna v. Turkish, 930
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both a claim of expertise in interpreting the test and an agreement to take
on the risk of using such results.236 Here, there is greater reason to impute
liability for any medical missteps to the physician for recommended
courses of action because the physician has affirmatively chosen to
adopt and integrate the results in the patient’s treatment plan.237 The
vast difference in liability risk gives physicians convincing incentive to
ignore the results of outside genetic tests in formulating treatment plans.
For now, this is the preferable course of action in order to minimize
medical malpractice.
The foregoing problems are distinct from the learned intermediary
doctrine as traditionally applied to the relationships between doctors,
patients, and pharmaceutical companies.238 Presumably, it is the doctor
who independently decides to undertake courses of treatment, so it makes
sense to impute responsibility to the doctor for giving warnings.239 The
physician is an active decisionmaker in introducing the drug to the
patient, and the physician usually has expert knowledge about the treatment’s
appropriateness and any side effects.240 However, a commercial genetic
test is outside the decisionmaking sphere.241 Accordingly, physicians
should face only limited liability in certain circumstances and face no
liability when DTC companies have essentially punted responsibility to
them by telling consumers to speak with medical providers for further
information. It would undermine the relationship between doctor and
A.2d 416 (N.J. 2007)). However, what counts as “medically material” regarding DTC
genetic tests is unclear because there is much disagreement about the degree of information
that physicians can impute to patients.
236. See, e.g., Richard Tutton et al., Genotyping the Future: Scientists’ Expectations
About Race/Ethnicity After BiDil, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 464, 464 (2008) (discussing the
sociological effects of the FDA-approved drug BiDil, made specifically for AfricanAmericans and available for physicians to prescribe based on an individual’s genetic
makeup). BiDil was the first drug tailored for a specific racial group, but one can easily
imagine an increase in other such treatments based on genetic makeup. Id.
237. Black et al., supra note 46, at 117 (noting that prophylactic mastectomies would be
one example of a plausible drastic step that could occur as a result of miscalculated
information given by the doctor based on genetic tests). But see CACI, supra note 185,
§ 506, at 442 (noting that, in California, instead of a but-for standard, physicians must
have undertaken only a medically acceptable treatment).
238. See Robertson, supra note 58, at 232 (discussing the learned intermediary
doctrine).
239. See Prebula, supra note 192, at 368.
240. Id.
241. When consumer-patients bring outside DTC tests—along with the advertising
claims touted by the company—inside the decisionmaking sphere, the influence of the
test results on the physician may weaken the physician-patient fiduciary relationship by
influencing the independent judgment of the physician. See Heather Harrell, Direct-toConsumer Advertising of Prescription Pharmaceuticals, the Learned Intermediary Doctrine,
and Fiduciary Duties, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 69, 78–83 (2011) (discussing the psychological
effect that DTC advertising for traditional pharmaceuticals has upon the physician-patient
fiduciary relationship in the context of the learned intermediary doctrine).
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patient by creating a fear of liability, prevent the free flow of unbiased
communication, and weaken the fiduciary relationship.242 If, however,
physicians actively decide to incorporate consideration of results into
their treatment plans, then some limited liability should apply.243
VIII. RECOMMENDATION: A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO IMPROVING
THE DTC GENETIC TESTING INDUSTRY
The most important and effective change is to extend GINA by better
defining key terms and to clearly define which agencies and parties have
regulatory power over the industry. This is necessary to address the
unique issues cropping up as a result of the DTC genetic testing industry. It
is key, however, to emphasize the importance of a holistic approach
because it will not only encourage active problem solving between all
interested parties but also best foster a long-term solution.244 The DTC
242. The discussion that some scholars engage in regarding the effect DTC advertising
has on medical treatment and traditional prescription pharmaceuticals is instructive and
relevant for the novel situation in which DTC tests are brought in to physicians’ offices.
See, e.g., id. at 80–83.
Exceptions to the LID are based mostly on a weak or nonexistent patient-physician
encounter. DTC advertising erodes the patient-physician relationship by
altering expectations of the relationship, shaping discussions during patient
encounters, and affecting prescribing practices, among other influences. In the
presence of DTC promotion, physicians may no longer meet the criteria of a
“learned intermediary,” since they are not the sole source of information for
the patient, and their judgment may be affected by such advertising. Changes
to the health care system independent of DTC advertising weaken the reasoning for
application of the LID and increase the potential influence of DTC advertising.
These changes also make it more difficult for physicians to be true “learned
intermediaries.” When deciding how DTC advertising should affect liability
of the manufacturer, all of these issues should be considered.
Id. at 83. The general concern—that DTC advertising brought in to the physicians’
sphere of expertise weakens their role as learned intermediaries—finds a cogent, parallel
application in the context of outside DTC tests brought in by a consumer who also brings
in an outside perspective of what test results are supposed to mean. See id. at 82 (“DTC
advertising changes the information the patient has with respect to treatment and condition,
alters views on proper physician roles, influences the content of discussion, and can
affect treatment decisions.”).
243. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
244. See Gary E. Marchant, Foreword, Law and the New Era of Personalized
Medicine, 48 JURIMETRICS J. 131, 134 (2008) (discussing Sharon Lewis, The Tissue Issue: A
Wicked Problem, 48 JURIMETRICS J. 193 (2008)). In the context of tissue collection, author
Sharon Lewis stated that a “wicked problem” is one that is “so complex and intractable
that it cannot be resolved by any one solution.” Id. “At best, such a problem can be
managed, but always imperfectly.” Id. The DTC genetic testing industry may be viewed
as a type of wicked problem because of the various interests pulling in different directions.
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companies engage in a variety of activities including ancestry reports,
simple-trait analysis, disease-risk prediction, drug-response prediction,
and even research.245 Each of these activities should be examined and
addressed separately to appropriately tailor regulation. This is so that
resources go to the most controversial activities, such as risk prediction
and drug-response prediction.246 Employing multiple approaches changes
the dynamic of problem solving to one that is collaborative in nature,
allowing for diversity of thought and maximum utility of expertise.247
A. Meeting the Challenge of Emerging Technologies with a
Combination of Solutions
DTC genetic testing and individual decisionmaking should not replace
practitioners in a traditional model of medicine who offer knowledge
and experience.248 Nevertheless, new emerging technologies can and do
supplement such traditional models.249 The goal is to provide enough
oversight and regulation to ensure that these new emerging technologies
provide accurate and reliable information to today’s consumer and to be
utilized by tomorrow’s medical professionals.250 This requires that DTC
companies start by effectively communicating risk assessments to
consumers.251 Whether the industry uses qualified physicians, scientists, or
genetic counselors as communication filters, or forgoes risk predictions
altogether, the industry must improve communication regarding its results.252
For such a new industry that trades in novel and evolving technology,
a holistic approach is necessary to protect the interests of the consumer,
the industry, and scientific and medical progress.253 An overly paternalistic
A holistic and flexible approach is critical in meeting these different interests. For an
analogous solution, see Tamir, supra note 4, at 213. Based on the variety of legal and
ethical issues surrounding DTC genetic tests, Tamir suggests a “harmonised” approach
to regulation. Id.
245. See, e.g., 23ANDME, supra note 203.
246. See McGuire et al., supra note 69, at 182 (pointing out that there is a lack of a
risk-stratification approach and that it would be useful to come up with one).
247. See Lobel, supra note 107, at 379–80.
248. See Braverman, supra note 8, at 495–96.
249. Id. at 496.
250. Id. at 495–96.
251. Black et al., supra note 46, at 117.
252. Id.
253. For an example of an alternative approach employed by Germany, see Tamir,
supra note 4, at 236 (citing Gendiagnostikgesetz [GenDG] [Genetic Diagnosis Act], July
31, 2009, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] at 2009 2529 (Ger.), available at
http://www2.bgbl.de/Xaver/media.xav?SID=anonymous3307876363287&tocf=Bundesa
nzeiger_BGBl_tocFrame&tf=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl_mainFrame&qmf=Bundesanzeiger
_BGBl_mainFrame&hlf=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl_mainFrame&bk=Bundesanzeiger_BG
Bl&name=bgbl%2FBundesgesetzblatt%20Teil%20I%2F2009%2FNr.%2050%20vom%
2004.08.2009%2Fbgbl109s2529.pdf), which discusses how Germany has enacted the
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approach or continued regulatory uncertainty is unreasonable and likely
to obliterate the industry,254 as at least one country has shown.255 The
better, holistic approach would encompass regulatory, legislative, selfregulatory, and educational solutions that flexibly work in tandem—this
type of approach would promote both a “rich definition of democracy”
and “facilitate wider imaginative horizons.”256
One approach to narrowly addressing the activities of the DTC
industry is to use a risk-stratification approach in which the more
controversial activities, such as risk prediction, are regulated more heavily
than the less controversial components, such as the ancestry and simpletrait results.257 This is desirable because it helps to funnel resources and
effort to the activities that most need attention. It also helps to organize

Human Genetic Examination Act, a strict law that went into effect in February 2010. To
read an English translation, see BUNDESRAT DRUCKSACHEN [BR] 374/09 (Ger.), available
at http://www.genomicslawreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/German-Act-Translation.
pdf. The Act essentially bans DTC genetic testing by implementing rigorous requirements.
Tamir, supra note 4, at 236; BUNDESRAT DRUCKSACHEN [BR] 374/09. The general opinion
on Germany’s approach seems to be that it is too strict and that it is an example of both
genetic exceptionalism and paternalism. See Tamir, supra note 4, at 236.
254. Potential consequences of regulatory uncertainty include reduced access to
capital for new or additional investments, fewer new innovative products, fewer startups,
litigation risks, reduced access to technology due to scaring off collaborators, and
encouraging overseas development. Dan Vorhaus et al., DTC Genetic Testing and the
FDA: Is There an End in Sight to the Regulatory Uncertainty?, GENOMES UNZIPPED
(June 16, 2011), http://www.genomesunzipped.org/2011/06/dtc-genetic-testing-and-thefda-is-there-an-end-in-sight-to-the-regulatory-uncertainty.php#more-3681.
255. Germany enacted the Genetic Diagnosis Act, an overly strict law that inhibits
innovation and has all but stopped the industry in its tracks. See supra note 253 and
accompanying text. However, it is also important to consider that the regulatory
frameworks and approaches across European countries vary widely. Katz & Schweitzer,
supra note 95, at 127. For example, some regulatory bodies might view clinical validity,
how accurately a test recognizes a marker, as the most important aspect. Id. Others may
view analytical validity, how accurately it predicts disease, as the most pressing concern.
Id. Because of these differences, there is little uniformity even on the international level
as to what consumers should expect. See id. at 129. While a Global Harmonization
Task Force, including the United States, European Union, Canada, Australia, and Japan,
is working to develop uniform regulation, id. (citing GLOBAL HARMONISATION TASK
FORCE, http://ghtf.org/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2012)), the fact that there is disagreement
within the individual countries indicates that it is a long road to a global solution. Id.
256. Lobel, supra note 107, at 442–43 (discussing the possibility of a “third way” of
governance that facilitates plural solutions as opposed to the traditional dichotomy
between “state-based, top-down regulation and a single-minded reliance on market-based
norms”).
257. See Javitt, supra note 150, at 817–18 (“Agencies should next assign regulation
to each test according to its level of risk.”); McGuire, supra note 69, at 181–82 (noting
the current lack of a risk-stratification approach and advocating its creation).
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the efforts for regulation in what likely will be a comprehensive
overhaul of the industry.258 However, this is only one starting point, and
it is necessary to include other approaches as part of a long-term solution.
The approach suggested in this Comment is similar to the riskstratification approach but encompasses a larger scale as a holistic,
solution-stratification approach.259 Implementing a variety of solutions
will increase the likelihood of addressing the variety of weaknesses in
the industry and provide the necessary flexibility to manage a technology
that is likely to evolve over time.260 Employing a wide variety of solution
strategies starts with small steps.261
B. A Legislative and Regulatory Approach To Extending GINA:
Reining In Advertising and Creating Uniform
Standards for Interpretation
Although heavily regulating the industry as a whole may be undesirable,
some regulation may be necessary in order to offer guidance to the industry,
courts, and consumers to navigate this complex and ever-evolving field.262
In particular, the most sensible approach would be for Congress to start
by extending GINA-like legislation to cover the activities of the DTC
industry, instead of covering only employment discrimination, insurance
discrimination, and privacy issues.263 Defining terms to adequately cover
the DTC industry as to communication and interpretation and delineating

258. See Gniady, supra note 86, at 2436 (noting that although there has been a lack
of regulation, this will likely not last long because of the growing public and business
interest in developing the genetic test industry).
259. See McGuire, supra note 69, at 181–82. McGuire notes that there is currently
not a risk-stratification approach regarding risk prediction. Javitt suggests such an
approach is necessary, pointing to the idea that disease risk prediction and drug-reaction
prediction pose more of a problem by potentially affecting how a consumer might make
healthcare choices, while ancestry and simple-trait analysis pose little such danger. Javitt,
supra note 150, at 817–18.
260. This is the best way to wrangle such a “wicked problem.” See Marchant, supra
note 244, at 134 (discussing Lewis, supra note 244).
261. Javitt, supra note 150, at 817–18.
262. See supra note 254 and accompanying text. But see Pauline T. Kim, Regulating
the Use of Genetic Information: Perspectives from the U.S. Experience, 31 COMP. LAB.
L. & POL’Y J. 693, 699 (2010). Kim notes that the purpose of enacting the GINA
legislation was to prevent discrimination and inequality specifically to “promote the use
of genetic technologies.” Id. at 698. So, any further extension of this legislation might
proceed under such a policy purpose as well—at least on paper, that is.
263. See Payne, supra note 44, at 58. GINA is quite limited, and it does not even
offer protection against genetic discrimination in life insurance, disability insurance,
long-term care insurance, and Medicare and Medicaid. Id.
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the scope of the FDA, CMS, and FTC power would be one step toward
allowing those agencies to craft a better-suited regulatory scheme.264
Because communication and interpretation can easily become a
subjective jungle,265 one way to consider how to regulate the industry’s
communicative and interpretive activities is to begin drawing boundaries
by looking to what the reasonable consumer would think. Reasonableness
is worth considering because the state of science does not offer clear-cut
answers for how genomic data should be conveyed.266 Section 285 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts indicates that reasonable conduct can
be established by legislative enactment or administrative regulation, by
judicial decision, or by the factfinder’s application of the facts to the
case if there is no enactment, regulation, or decision.267 The standard
for communication with consumers is not obvious, as evidenced by
DTC genetic testing companies’ use of various standards of interpretation,
and because reasonable minds can differ in the absence of regulatory,
legislative, or judicial guidance, the FDA should lead an effort to establish
uniform standards to which industry members must adhere.268 Therefore, it
is crucial for Congress to define the scope of the FDA’s role so that the
FDA and other agencies such as the FTC may act with clear authority to
set industry standards and draw the boundaries around what should be
considered “reasonable.”269 Furthermore, waiting for the courts to come

264. To see an interesting and, perhaps, promising set of guidelines the United
Kingdom has promulgated, see the Human Genetics Commission’s guidelines published
in August 2010. HUMAN G ENETICS C OMM ’ N , A C OMMON F RAMEWORK OF PRINCIPLES
FOR DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER GENETIC TESTING SERVICES (2010) (U.K.), available at
http://www.hgc.gov.uk/UploadDocs/DocPub/Document/HGC%20Principles%20for%20
DTC%20genetic%20tests%20-%20final.pdf. It covers various aspects of DTC genetic
testing such as advertising and marketing, genetic counseling, consent, interpretation of
tests results, and provision of test results. Id. at 6–13.
265. To consider how the average consumer may be misled, see supra text
accompanying note 105.
266. See generally Pearson & Manolio, supra note 103 (discussing an approach for
interpretation of GWAS results by experts, yet not addressing how such complex
information could be conveyed to the lay consumer).
267. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 (1965).
268. See, e.g., DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 20 (statement of Rep. Diana DeGette,
Member, H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations).
269. For now, there is much regulatory uncertainty. Vorhaus et al., supra note 254.
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the FDA posted a formal
notice in the Federal Register to open up the issue of regulating the industry to public
comment before holding an advisory meeting to discuss regulatory issues. Molecular
and Clinical Genetics Panel of the Medical Devices Advisory Committee, 76 Fed. Reg.
25, 6623 (Feb. 7, 2011). This indicates an intention to regulate, but as of this writing, the
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up with a solution is undesirable.270 The courts need guidance for any
decision on this topic, and allowing courts to fashion a standard will
likely only frustrate judges and yield unsatisfying solutions begotten of
necessity, and not workability—they cannot be expected to be experts
after all.271 Additionally, having Congress and the regulatory agencies
work through a solution before most problems reach the courts would
allow the industry time to implement necessary changes.272
The FTC should also enact strict regulation for the advertising component
of the industry. Strictly regulating advertising minimizes industry intrusion
and a government takeover because it will eliminate false advertising

FDA has yet to propose any concrete language, including any draft language. The DHHS and
FDA convened a two-day meeting to discuss a number of issues including: (1) the risks
and benefits of permitting a consumer to have “direct access” to “clinical” genetic tests
without the involvement of a genetic professional; (2) the risks involved in and possible
solutions for “incorrect, miscommunicated, or misunderstood test results for clinical genetic
tests”; and (3) “[t]he level and type of scientific evidence appropriate for supporting direct-toconsumer genetic testing claims including whether it should be different than that
required to support similar claims for prescription use clinical genetic tests.” Id. at 6624.
The notice defines the scope of the term clinical genetic test to include (1) genetic tests
determining carrier status for hereditary conditions; (2) genetic tests predicting disease
risk in currently asymptomatic individuals; and (3) genetic tests indicating drug response. Id.
270. See Gniady, supra note 86, at 2437. Gniady notes that as of 2008, there were
over 1000 largely unregulated genetic tests available on the market. Id. at 2436. She
also notes that the lack of regulation is unlikely to last because of growing public and
business interest. Id. The combination of growing interest and a lack of regulation
increases the likelihood that courts might need to resolve potential problems without the
tools they need to analyze them.
271. See generally Sebastiani et al., supra note 128, for a real-world methodology
and interpretation flub by experts, which does not bode well for courts wading through
technical issues without any helpful guidance. See also Calling GWAS Longevity Calls
into Question, GENOMEWEB (July 06, 2010), http://www.genomeweb.com/blog/callinggwas-longevity-calls-question (discussing the flub). A research group at Boston University
managed to publish an article in one of the top science journals, Science, and described
gene variants it found that were related to life longevity. See generally Sebastiani et al.,
supra note 128. The problem is that these results could not be recreated by other researchers
who read the paper. See Calling GWAS Longevity Calls into Question, supra. It turns
out that because of a technical flaw, the results were compromised. Hesman Saey, supra
note 128. The moral of this story is quite related to the DTC story. If a faulty research
paper could make it into one of the world’s preeminent scientific journals, passing
rigorous peer review, then surely lay people, Congress, and even scientific or medical
peers could be misled about DTC genetic results based on other GWAS. This tells us
that the problem of misleading consumers must be carefully thought out before courts
are deluged with a problem they are not equipped to handle. This is not a “solution in
search of a problem,” as some had said of GINA legislation that preempted major court
involvement. 110 Cong. Rec. E120–21 (Jan. 16, 2007) (statement of Hon. Louise M.
Slaughter). The same reasons for Congress to move quickly to speak with one voice are
relevant here—bolstering the confidence of the general public and promoting progress in
genetics research.
272. See generally HUMAN GENETICS COMM’N, supra note 264. Such guidelines,
although not fully comprehensive, would be a good starting point for the United States to
fashion similar guidelines or regulation. Id.
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claims from the very outset.273 However, the protections offered to the
consumer would be even more substantial if advertising regulation works in
tandem with clear and uniform guidelines for the delivery of genetic
testing results. The very first communication a DTC company has with
a consumer is its advertising, and this frames what the consumer will expect
from the company. Preventing companies from making false or misleading
claims at the front end of the transaction prevents a further string of
problems as the transaction continues.274 Consumers can then make
fully informed choices regarding the product or service they hope to receive.
This forces companies to be honest about their services instead of playing
to consumers’ fears, preexisting beliefs, and speculation.275 A preference
for heavy advertising regulation—as opposed to heavy regulation of
the industry’s business model, which is to offer consumers a nonmedical
service to enable review of their genetic data—preserves consumers’
desire to maintain consumer autonomy while ensuring consumer
protection.276 Regulating claims made on company websites or through
other advertisements, including slogans, promises, and descriptions,
encourages honesty from the first contact companies make with consumers
and prevents potential harm in the form of injury or liability.277
The current state of the law provides companies with wide latitude to
make claims that have a high potential of misleading the average
consumer. 278 If the FTC deems advertising false or misleading, it can
273. See DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 22 (statement of Rep. Diana DeGette,
Member, H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations) (“The rapidly growing field of
genetic testing symbolizes the entrepreneurial spirit and innovation that makes America
great. The possibility of excessive government regulations, which would and could
effectively put an end to an increasing technology, should not be our goal.”).
274. See, e.g., Blumer v. Acu-Gen Biolabs, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 2d 81, 84 (D. Mass.
2009) (discussing how female consumers undertook dangerous and unnecessary procedures,
often at their own expense without insurance coverage, as a result of receiving faulty test
results from false advertising of prenatal genetic tests).
275. See Tamir, supra note 4, at 232 (describing how the way DTC genetic test
advertisers word their advertisements often overstates the efficacy or merits of the tests,
while also downplaying the weaknesses).
276. See Martinez-Cabrera, supra note 26.
277. See Gniady, supra note 86, at 2452–53 (noting that although the FTC has the
authority to regulate false and misleading advertising claims, it is a limited avenue of
regulation for widespread consumer protection).
278. See, e.g., About Gene Partner, GENEPARTNER, http://www.genepartner.com/
index.php/aboutgenepartner (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) (“The probability for successful and
long-lasting romantic relationships is greatest in couples with high genetic compatibility. . . .
With genetically highly compatible people we feel that rare sensation of perfect chemistry.
This is the body’s receptive and welcoming response when immune systems harmonize
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issue a cease-and-desist enforcement action and require the offending
company to pull or change the ads.279 The FTC should be encouraged to
take a more active role by issuing such enforcement actions to incentivize
companies to engage in ethical advertising.280 Descriptions of what results
will tell consumers and promises made as to what the company offers
should be objective, absolutely accurate, and regularly screened by a
panel of experts assigned by the FDA or FTC to prevent misleading
or exaggerated statements.281 Heavy regulation and screening in this
area should be implemented because of the high risk of consumer fraud
stemming from the technical nature of the tests.
Congress and federal agencies should focus on creating uniform
standards for interpretation, including requirements for clear company
communications regarding methods and limits, and making relied-upon
resources easily available.282 To give a concrete example of how many
and fit well together.”). Furthermore, the FTC has not aggressively instituted enforcement
actions. Drabiak-Syed, supra note 207, at 77.
279. Drabiak-Syed, supra note 207, at 76.
280. Id. at 77.
281. But see Brienne Taylor Greiner, Note, A Tough Pill To Swallow: Does the
First Amendment Prohibit WV from Regulating Pharmaceutical Companies’ Advertising
Expenses To Lower the Cost of Prescription Drugs?, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 107, 120 (2006)
(“The commercial speech doctrine protects communication made for the sole purpose of
selling products or services. While commercial speech does not receive the strongest
degree of protection that the First Amendment can give, it does receive a heightened
level of scrutiny.” (footnotes omitted)). One wonders if the DTC genetic industry may
raise a First Amendment defense.
282. The need to address the regulatory and legislative gap for genetic tests has not
gone unnoticed, and lawmakers and administrative agencies are taking slow steps to
address the problem. See, e.g., Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
§ 27, 125 Stat. 284, 338–39 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C.); see also Molecular and
Clinical Genetics Panel of the Medical Devices Advisory Committee, 76 Fed. Reg. 6623
(Feb. 7, 2011) (opening up to public comment the issues surrounding regulation of DTC
testing); Molecular and Clinical Genetics Panel of the Medical Devices Advisory
Committee, 76 Fed. Reg. 18227 (Apr. 1, 2011) (extending the comment period through
May 2, 2011). The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, enacted in 2011, is one very
recent example where Congress has taken another step toward acknowledging and
providing guidance, albeit minor, to the thorny problem of ensuring quality, beneficial
access to genetic tests. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 27. In the context of patent
reform, section 27 gives authority to the United State Patent Office (USPTO) “to provide
independent, confirming genetic diagnostic test activity where gene patents and exclusive
licensing for primary genetic diagnostic tests exist.” Id. § 27(a). In effectuating this goal,
section 27 raises familiar criteria for examination including investigating quality level
due to lack of second opinion testing; harm to innovative activity; impact that exclusive
licensing has on the medical profession, noting particularly the “interpretation of testing
results and performance of testing procedures”; and impact on cost. Id. § 27(b). Although
newly enacted section 27 deals very specifically with patents and clarifies little more at
this point than giving an entity authority to investigate a solution further and requiring
the director of the USPTO to report to the House of Representatives on the findings, it is
one more much-needed step in the right direction. See Request for Comments and Notice of
Public Hearings on Genetic Diagnostic Testing, 77 Fed. Reg. 3748, 3748–49 (Jan. 25,
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variables are at play in delineating uniform standards for interpretation
such as methodology, consider the current debate on gene patents.283
Patents play a role in regulating standards of result analysis accurately
communicating the scope of DTC testing services.284 It may be possible
for a laboratory to exclusively hold a gene-testing patent and to become the
sole provider of such genetic testing.285 This would limit the accuracy and
analysis of the laboratory’s own results as well as those of other labs that
may not be able to license the use of the patented genetic testing.286
Although companies must disclose the limits of their testing, there is a
public health problem in allowing the possibility of holdouts at the
expense of offering the most accurate picture of an individual’s genetic
2012) (announcing two public hearings to gather information for preparing reports, one
in Alexandria, Virginia, and the second at the University of San Diego).
283. See generally Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 635 F.3d 1329 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
284. See generally Eileen M. Kane, Patent-Mediated Standards in Genetic Testing,
2008 UTAH L. REV. 835, 835 (2008) (discussing the problem patenting can pose in regulating
genetic testing).
285. Id. at 847–48.
286. Id. For instance, Myriad Genetics, based in Salt Lake City, Utah, patented its
sequencing test to detect BRCA1 and BRCA2, genetic variants associated with breast and
ovarian cancer. Id. at 848. The unrelated King laboratory published a paper finding that
its test, called multiplex ligation probe amplification, detected genomic rearrangements
in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, such as large deletions and mutations, in women who
tested negatively under the Myriad test. Id. at 850–51. The King researchers noted that
“genetic testing, as currently carried out in the United States, does not provide all
available information to” patients. Id. at 851 (quoting Tom Walsh et al., Spectrum of
Mutations in BRCA1, BRCA2, CHEK2, and TP53 in Families at High Risk of Breast
Cancer, 295 JAMA 1379, 1386 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Use of
patent rights can set a “de facto clinical standard” by limiting the testing options available. Id.
at 852; see also Wendy S. Rubenstein, Inherited Breast Cancer, in MOLECULAR
PATHOLOGY IN CLINICAL PRACTICE 207, 208 (Debra G.B. Leonard et al. eds., 2007)
(noting that the technique or set of techniques chosen for mutation detection in BRCA1
and BRCA2 “must be comprehensive in order to provide an accurate clinical result”).
This is a problem for the scientific community because it limits peer review and
compensatory research. Kane, supra note 284, at 852. It is also a problem for patients
and physicians because it prevents comprehensive testing that can lead to the most
accurate results possible, and this limitation can impact medical and personal choices.
See Gaia Bernstein, In the Shadow of Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2257, 2296
(2010) (discussing how physicians often charged patients exorbitant prices for the test
because Myriad essentially forced anyone testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2 to have the
testing processed through its facility in Salt Lake City, Utah, regardless of where the
patient was in the world); Kane, supra note 284, at 851–52 (“[S]cientific literature has
consistently noted that the ongoing BRCA1 and BRCA2 patent issues must be factored
into any assessment of progress in the field of genetic testing for inherited breast and
ovarian cancer.”).
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makeup.287 Only one district court has recently tried to draw a line as to
what kind of genetic testing and material is patentable.288 Some have
argued for a statutory research and innovation exemption,289 but in light of
the burgeoning DTC genetic testing field, it may be more prudent to
offer a statutory exemption that facilitates using patented materials
whenever a DTC company or physician will be offering higher level
analysis to a consumer, such as disease-risk prediction or drug-response
prediction.290 This would improve quality for consumer-patients who
would be unaware that their results could be inadequate based on patent
monopolies happening behind the scenes.291
C. Self-Regulatory Approach: The Carrot, Not the Stick
Because commercial genetic testing is relatively new, some amount of
trial and error will be inevitable. It may even be desirable because it will
allow companies to freely experiment with innovative ideas. To allow
room for growth, Congress and regulatory agencies must draft solutions
flexible enough to allow companies to implement their own solutions
and remedies where possible. Encouraging such self-regulation means
decisionmakers should include industry leaders and better differentiate
between those more reputable companies and the bottom-feeders.292 To
do so, industry leaders should continue to be encouraged in the
crafting of uniform standards, and those who cooperate with Congress
and governmental agencies should be rewarded.293 For instance, some

287. See Kane, supra note 284, at 851–52.
288. Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 237 (holding that Myriad’s
method of identifying potential cancer therapeutics by utilizing cells injected with altered
breast cancer susceptibility genes was not patentable because Myriad’s claimed process
was simply the scientific method), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 635 F.3d 1329. The Federal
Circuit overturned this result in part, bringing back the status quo to gene-testing patents.
It remains to be seen whether or not the case will be taken up by the Supreme Court.
289. See Bernstein, supra note 286, at 2298–99 (discussing suggestions by academics
and legislators for an exemption to facilitate research and innovation); Kane, supra note
284, at 852–53.
290. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 286, at 2299 (suggesting a healthcare provider
exemption and noting that this aspect had been largely neglected by academics and legislators
with the exception of the rejected Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of
2002, which included an ancillary exemption for healthcare providers (citing Genomic
Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, H.R. 3967, 107th Cong. (2002))).
291. See id. at 2300–01 (noting a health provider exemption would clear up legal
uncertainty).
292. See GAO REPORT, supra note 31, at 15–16 tbl.2 (describing the GAO’s
findings of widespread deceptive marketing, misinformation, and questionable practices
among several companies).
293. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 58, at 242–43 (discussing how in 2008, Navigenics
announced it would develop a set of industry standards and that it would consult
stakeholders involved). During the 2009 DTC hearing, general counsel for 23andMe
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companies have independently addressed the need for an opt-out option
to preserve the “right not to know” about potentially harmful genetic
information.294 Without recognizing such self-regulating efforts and
remaining flexible, federal regulation could be much too stringent, stifling
the growth and creativity that could have led to otherwise fast advances
in the field’s technology. 295 Instead, decisionmakers should reward
responsible behavior, such as by quickly admitting and rectifying mistakes
or by improving practices, by maintaining a certain amount of breathing
room free of government intrusion.296 To give another example, in response
to worries that most of the genomic data pools consisted of white
populations, one company included an informational page on its website
with a chart detailing which population datasets are represented for
tested diseases.297 Another company increased the availability of genetic
counselors to help consumers interpret its results.298
Another approach would be to leave it up to the free market to take
care of the problem of faulty interpretive and communicative results—in
this way, customers will naturally weed out companies that deceive and
do not deliver as promised. Because the Internet is still somewhat of a
legal hinterland, it lends itself to this kind of individualist ideal.299
Although in some industries such a laissez-faire approach may be more
stated it supported Congress and the FDA in creating an improved regulatory framework
and that the company had already been working with the FDA, NIH, and others since
2007. DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 81 (statement of Ashley Gould, General Counsel,
23andMe). Gould noted 23andMe would be presenting its regulatory proposal the
following day to the FDA. Id.
294. Tamir, supra note 4, at 215–18 tbl.1, 228–29.
295. See Lobel, supra note 107, at 379–80. Lobel describes the traditional,
predominantly regulatory approach as “one-size-fits-all.” Id. at 379. Lobel argues for an
alternative, legally sustainable model that “encompass[es] a multitude of values and
account[s] for conflict and compromise.” Id. at 380. Such an approach “acknowledge[s]
the diversity and changing interests of many stakeholders.” Id.
296. See, e.g., Martinez-Cabrera, supra note 26 (reporting that when personal genomics
company 23andMe mixed up ninety-six customers’ DNA results, the company quickly
responded and many customers defended the company despite the mix-up).
297. See, e.g., Health Reports: By Ethnicity, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/
health/ethnicity/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
298. See, e.g., Our Experts, PATHWAY GENOMICS, https://www.pathway.com/aboutus/our-experts (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
299. See Lobel, supra note 107, at 436 (noting that some have declared the Internet
a “government-free zone” and that the 1996 Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace
declared “governments of the industrial world . . . you of the past . . . leave us alone” (quoting
John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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workable, it should not be solely relied upon when the subject matter is
technical enough to risk confusing the consumer and obfuscating problems
inherent in industry techniques, methods, and claims. Because of
the undeveloped regulatory structure of the industry, this laissez-faire
approach is in place by default, yet as the GAO reports reveal, it is too
easy to deceive the average lay consumer for this to be an adequate sole
method of market control.
D. Educational Improvements
Regulatory agencies should also encourage educational avenues of
improving oversight of this industry. The most important group to
educate is the public, which also might be the most difficult group to
educate effectively because of its size and varying levels of knowledge
bases.300 However, involving industry leaders, qualified physicians, and
regulatory agencies in this education movement could not only lead to
educating the interested consumer but also help to improve industry
standards.301 For these reasons, leaders should support grant funding or
public campaigns to educate the public.302
If physicians or other professionals are to play increasingly significant
roles in the communication of genetic information, better education in
the science of genetics and genomics will be necessary.303 This will allow
professionals who become involved to properly communicate what the
genomic data means and the strength of any risk assessments made as a
result.304 Medical professionals’ vast deficit in knowledge of genetic
and genomic analysis has not gone unnoticed by members of the medical
and scientific community.305

300. See, e.g., Payne, supra note 44, at 63. Educating the public is an old problem
in genetic issues—Payne notes the importance of “[e]ducating the public about GINA’s
limitations and the limitations of state laws . . . for those seeking to prevent genetic
discrimination.” Id.; see also Lobel, supra note 107, at 454–55 (discussing how the
public’s ability to process increasingly ubiquitous and complex information becomes
more of a problem because of the “[a]symmetry of resources among private groups and
differences in the organization of knowledge communities”).
301. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 107, at 457 (discussing how, in the context of
workforce development and vocational training, encouraging ongoing training and
government support best combines “participatory decision making and professionalism”).
302. Novick, supra note 67, at 649.
303. Black et al., supra note 46, at 119; see also Tamir, supra note 4, at 220
(“It . . . seems advisable to invest in the education of healthcare professionals so that
more of them will become proficient in the ‘language of genetics.’”).
304. Black et al., supra note 46, at 119.
305. See, e.g., Susan Ipaktchian, Medical School To Offer Course That Gives
Students Option of Studying Their Own Genotype Data, STAN. SCH. MED. (June 7, 2010),
http://med.stanford.edu/ism/2010/june/genotype.html.
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Some institutions have initiated efforts to educate the physicians of
tomorrow to be better prepared for major technological advances such as
personalized-medicine approaches to healthcare.306 For instance, Stanford
Medical School started a “Genomics and Personalized Medicine” class
that began in autumn 2010, in which students would discuss their personal
genotyping results received through commercial testing.307 Just as in the
U.C. Berkeley genetic testing program, opponents voiced privacy concerns
regarding data handling as well as concerns over how well equipped
students would be to receive and interpret their test results.308 However,
Stanford went through extensive planning to address ethical pitfalls, and
the educational value was deemed strong enough to give the innovative
approach a try.309 Such initiatives should be encouraged as one step toward
educating individuals about what a genetic test can tell someone.
The FDA and FTC have the potential unique role as facilitators to
bring interested parties together.310 This is also a way in which older or
established physicians could be offered opportunities to become better
acquainted with the new emerging science.311 Because many physicians
show a desire to learn more about genetic testing and because of the
cutting-edge nature of the technology and ethical problems surrounding
genetic testing, the government is in a unique position to bring together
regulatory agencies, congressional members, attorneys, healthcare providers,
and DTC industry members in colloquia or symposia to discuss and
learn about emerging genetic testing issues.312 Additionally, because

306. Gregorio M. Garcia, The FDA and Regulation of Genetic Tests: Building
Confidence and Promoting Safety, 48 JURIMETRICS J. 217, 233–34 (2008) (discussing the
paradigm shift from one-size-fits-all healthcare to targeted treatments based on unique
genetic profiles and citing two reports supporting the topic).
307. Ipaktchian, supra note 305.
308. Ferris Jabr, Exposing the Student Body: Stanford Joins U.C. Berkeley in
Controversial Genetic Testing of Students, SCI. AM. (July 6, 2010), http://www.scientific
american.com/article.cfm?id=exposing-the-student-body.
309. Id. (describing the differences in level of planning and implemented safeguards
between the U.C. Berkeley incoming freshmen genetic testing program and the Stanford
genetic testing class regarding what made the latter more acceptable than the former).
310. See Lobel, supra note 107, at 373 (arguing for a “new governance model” that
includes multiple actors at various stages of the legal process and “shifting citizens from
passive to active roles”).
311. Black et al., supra note 46, at 119.
312. See, e.g., Gaia Bernstein, Introduction, Toward a General Theory of Law and
Technology, 8 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 441, 441–42 (2007) (summarizing a symposium
organized to address the issue of whether it would be best to address new technologies
by regulating them in isolation or by developing a new general theory of law and
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those in the DTC industry and medical field may not fully understand
regulations put forth by the FDA or Congress, putting together colloquia,
symposia, or other education materials is a necessary step for the
implementation of any new regulation or legislation.313
It is also necessary for legislators, judges, and attorneys to become
better educated about genetics and legal implications before making
decisions in this area.314 The speed with which science has advanced,
and the speed with which it will continue to develop, necessitates a new
approach—lawmakers must adequately understand the science underlying
these new technologies, and only then will they be able to fashion
prospective laws with clear foresight rather than reacting to problems
post hoc.315 All parties involved—the consumer-patient, physicians,
industry members, Congress, and regulatory agencies, attorneys, and
judges—need to understand one another and the issues in a meaningful
way.316 One way to do this is for the government to assemble diverse
committees composed of appropriate, unbiased experts that would deal
specifically with emerging scientific or medical technologies impacting
the consumer marketplace.317 Even if all parties cannot come to speak
the same language, whether it is the language of the lawyer, FDA official,

technology). Perhaps similar symposia would be beneficial where parties of varied
backgrounds meet and present works.
313. See FED. DRUG ADMIN. & U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUBLIC
MEETING ON OVERSIGHT OF LABORATORY DEVELOPED TESTS 171–72 (2010) (statement
of Dr. Gail Vance, American College of Pathologists).
FDA-speak is foreign to laboratories. We know CLIA . . . . We report to
CLIA . . . [B]ut we don’t have a clue, and I’m just speaking for myself, about
FDA.
I mean, . . . QSR, Labeling, really these are terms that you guys use, or many of
you, may use every day, but we don’t. So there is an educational problem here.
There is a chasm here that I think we have to be well-aware of and it’s going to
take education, education and more education to bridge that.
Id. at 171.
314. See id. at 171–72.
315. Black et al., supra note 46, at 120.
316. See, e.g., FED. DRUG ADMIN. & U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra
note 313.
317. See Christine Dugas, Warren Begins Shaping Agency: She Says New Consumer
Protection Bureau Will Level Playing Field with Big Banks, USA TODAY, Dec. 29, 2010,
at 3B. The Obama administration has been more active than previous presidential
administrations, extending consumer protection by creating the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, implemented by special advisor and Harvard professor Elizabeth
Warren. Id. This may indicate a more active role in shaping consumer protection laws
and regulations in general. See also Laboratory Test Improvement Act, S. 736, 110th
Cong. §§ 1–9 (2007) (introduced by then-Senators Barack Obama and Edward Kennedy).
Senate Bill 736 suggested extending FDA jurisdiction to cover DTC genetic testing
activities, but it never went anywhere. Patsner, supra note 53, at 277.
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scientist, physician, or layperson, efforts should be made to understand
these different languages and mindsets.318
IX. CONCLUSION
The advancements in the DTC genetic testing industry offer consumers a
new opportunity to learn about themselves. These advancements
promise a revolution in personalized medicine for tomorrow. Thus, it is
imperative for Congress and the FDA to exercise restraint and continue
to work together with all stakeholders to “spur the industry” to address
problems.319
The passage of GINA was one critical step toward an evolving body
of law in this area, but as the science in this area continues to progress, it
is only the first step.320 A more robust body of law governing genetic
information is needed to help guide the public, the industry, and courts
before litigation occurs.321
A holistic approach would best ensure the success of a long-term
solution.322 Congress and regulatory agencies must start at the ground
level by establishing a framework of definitions that accounts for the
various activities of the DTC industry, such as ancestry, disease-risk
prediction, drug-response prediction, and simple-trait analysis. Roles
and responsibilities between all parties should be defined. This will help
create consistent standards to which the DTC industry must adhere.
Self-regulation should also be encouraged to allow industry members to
take responsibility and pride in evolving the industry. To foster this, the
government should not be overly paternalistic by essentially taking over
these companies323 or, worse, by stamping them out.324 Finally, new
318. See Patsner, supra note 53, at 277.
319. DTC Hearing, supra note 9, at 22 (statement of Rep. Robert Latta, Member, H.
Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations).
320. Id.; see also Abiola, supra note 44, at 858 (discussing the limitations on private
causes of action in GINA).
321. See, e.g., Blumer v. Acu-Gen Biolabs, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D. Mass. 2009)
(adjudicating a class action litigation based on false advertising of the accuracy of prenatal
genetic tests). Blumer is an example of what could be avoided by creating an effective
regulatory framework now.
322. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 107, at 385 (discussing how a holistic approach to
problem solving avoids a fragmentary approach, while taking into account multiple,
interconnected issues).
323. See Evans & Green, supra note 152, at 569. Evans and Green discuss the need
for simple transparency, that open labeling and honestly telling consumers how tests are
conducted can avoid paternalism. Id. In fact, the authors note that many leading companies
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approaches to educating future generations of consumers, patients,
researchers, and doctors should be encouraged. Access to our genetic
information empowers us, and we are on the cusp of a revolutionary
paradigm shift in how medical professionals, researchers, and the general
public view individual genetic information. In the wake of this new
horizon, the approach we take today will shape the world of tomorrow; it
is time to embrace a new, holistic approach that nurtures limitless
possibility.

have already taken laudable steps toward improving the industry by publishing how they
arrive at risk estimates on their websites. Id. Such efforts should be rewarded by
decisionmakers.
324. See Novick, supra note 67, at 647. Novick argues the solution is not to stamp
out the industry through state or federal regulation. Id. Even if this were the goal, as we
have seen though the proliferation and availability of prescription drugs via the Internet,
the market will likely defeat complete obliteration. See id.
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